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Abstract 
In September 2014, the German engineering and manufacturing company Siemens 
announced the plan to acquire the American manufacturer of oil and gas equipment and 
service provider, Dresser-Rand for $83 a share.  
In a standalone valuation, Siemens can be valued between € 87 and €104 and tends to 
be undervalued. Contrarily, Dresser-Rand appears to be overvalued, since the current 
market price of $68 is at the upper valuation range of $36 to $88.1  
Additional revenues and reduced costs, ex transaction and implementation costs are 
worth $141 to $458 million and may add synergies of $1.8 to $6 a share to the 
standalone value of Dresser-Rand.  
Despite the fact that Dresser-Rand fits into Siemens’ Power and Gas division from a 
strategic point of view and that the M&A sentiment is currently beneficial to tap into the 
M&A market, an acquisition price of $83 seems to be fairly high. Siemens should not 
realize the deal and offer a premium of 21% to the current market price. The thesis 
recommends an acquisition price range of $47 to $73.2 
This case study shows that the world of M&A is fascinating, but also complex. Bid-prices 
and valuations often substantially diverge – depending on the strategic fit and potential 
synergies. The thesis mentions shareholder pressure, unsuccessful recent acquisition 
activities, legal & technological burden, high cash balances and personal interests as 











                                                          
1
 Current market prices as of September 1, 2014 
2
 Adjusted standalone valuation Dresser-Rand ($45 -$67) + Synergy value ($1.8 - $6) 
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1. Introduction 
On September 22, 2014 Siemens AG announced the acquisition of the American supplier 
of equipment solutions to the oil & gas industry, Dresser-Rand. After several bids, from 
$66 to $73, Siemens finally offered $83 a share, which amounts to a total transaction 
value of approximately $7.6 billion. 3 
“As the premium brand in the global energy infrastructure markets, Dresser-Rand is a 
perfect fit for the Siemens portfolio. The combined activities will create a world-class 
provider for the growing oil & gas markets. With this, Dresser-Rand will become ‘The oil 
and gas’ company within Siemens and fit right into our Siemens Vision 2020” – Joe Kaeser, 
President and CEO of Siemens AG.4 
When I started the case study, a friendly $83 takeover bid was already in the market and 
the transaction was expected to be closed in summer 2015. Besides a high acquisition 
premium of 21%5, slumping oil prices and depreciating Euro to US-Dollar had aroused 
sharp criticism for the transaction price both, from Siemens’ shareholders and financial 
press. The controversial debate and the medial presence have motivated me to work on 
this particular case. The thesis intends to answer the following core questions:    
1. From a strategic point of view, does Dresser-Rand add value to the conglomerate 
business of Siemens? How does the transaction fit into the changing energy 
business culture from conventional to alternative energy solutions? 
 
2. Is an acquisition price of $7.6 billion reasonable? Can strategic motives and 
potential synergies justify a premium of 21%?   
 
3. What are potential drivers in the bidding process of this acquisition? Which role 
embodies the CEO and how can power be effectively managed and controlled in 
Mergers & Acquisitions (in the following M&A)? 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Including an additional ticking fee of $0.55 per month from March 2015 onwards 
4
 Siemens’ official deal announcement, September 22, 2014 
5
 Offer price compared to the pre-acquisition price of Dresser-Rand as of September 2, 2014 – $68,36 
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The thesis is structured into four main parts:  
In the beginning, a Literature Review provides the reader with the necessary knowledge 
of valuation techniques and methodologies, as well as selected M&A characteristics.  
Thereafter, the relevant industries and companies are described, so that the reader is 
able to understand the strategic rationale behind the transaction and has 
comprehensive background information to understand the case.  
The third part focuses on valuation. First, on the basis of different valuation techniques, 
target and acquirer are valued independently in a standalone scenario. Second, potential 
synergies are first identified and quantified and then added to the standalone valuation.  
Afterwards, a thorough comparison of the standalone valuation with the ex-acquisition 
valuation, including synergies is drawn.  
Finally, the results are summarized and a potential acquisition of Dresser-Rand is 
evaluated from a strategic and more importantly financial point of view. The conclusion 
intends to answer the core questions and finishes with a transaction recommendation.  
The underlying data of this case study is predominantly as of the beginning of 
September 2014, when Siemens had not yet announced the deal.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
The Literature Review intends to provide readers with different backgrounds with the 
basic knowledge, which is crucial to understand the case. The section should not be 
considered as extensive and profound. For extending knowledge on valuation, further 
readings through contemporary valuation literature are advisable.    
The Literature Review consists of two main parts:   
 Valuation Techniques: The first part focuses on basic theory methods of 
evaluating companies.  
 Merger & Acquisitions: The second part covers special characteristics of 
evaluating M&A and different views and opinions from literature. The cardinal 
question, whether or not M&A adds value is also discussed.  Besides that, this 
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part includes a current M&A activity section, which helps the reader to classify a 
potential Dresser-Rand acquisition into the current M&A market environment.  
 
2.2 Valuation Techniques  
One of the key performance drivers of companies is the evaluation of corporate actions. 
Whether a company allocates resources for merging with- or acquiring other firms, 
investing in projects, entering strategic partnerships or simply launching products, a 
thorough valuation is absolutely crucial. A mispricing based on an incorrect valuation 
may lead to dramatic negative consequences for the company and its competitiveness. 
Therefore, a proper valuation coins the success of a company.  
Theory distinguishes between the following four fundamental valuation approaches: 
1. Intrinsic Value approach – A company is worth what it will generate.  
2. External benchmark approach – A company is worth what others buy/sell it for. 
3. Analogical approach – A company is worth what other companies are worth. 
4. Patrimonial approach – A company is worth what it owns. 
In practice, a thorough valuation comprises of a mix of several methods. Eccles, Lanes & 
Wilson (1999) lay stress on the fact, that there is no single correct price. In general, 
valuation can be seen as a function of cash, timing and risk (Luehrmann 1997). The 
majority of literature considers the intrinsic method superior to other approaches 
because it values the company on the basis of future cash flows and looks at the 
economic value creation. In contrast to that, the other three approaches consider the 
present or past (Appendix 1).  
 
2.2.1 Intrinsic Value approach 
Evaluating a company by estimating the net present value of future generated cash flows 
has become the most popular approach for corporate assets during the 1970s 
(Luehrman 1997). Estimated future cash flows, which can be either Free Cash Flow to 
the Firm, Free Cash Flow to the Equity or Dividends, are discounted to the present at a 
risk-adjusted rate.  
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Table 1: Overview of cash flow types and corresponding discount rates  
 Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
(FCFF) 
Free Cash Flow to 
the Equity (FCFE) 
Dividends 
Remunerate  Shareholders & Debtholders Shareholders 
Risk adjusted 
Discount rate 
Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC) 
Cost of Equity 
Value  Enterprise Value Equity Value 
Flow  Economic Flow Shareholders Flow 
 
 
The FCFF includes funds which can be distributed to shareholders and debtholders. A 
simplified concept is:  
Table 2: The concept of Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF)  
Operating Results 
after Tax 
Non-cash items Growth financing 
EBIT – Taxes on EBIT 
+ Depreciation    
+ Provisions considered as  
reserve 
- Investments  
- Δ Working Capital 
 
Deducting interest and principal payments from the FCFF isolates the cash flows solely 
to shareholders: 
FCFE = FCFF – interest (after taxes) – principal payments 
Applying the Gordon Growth Model, namely calculating the net present value of future 
dividend payments to evaluate a company’s price is less popular than the Discounted 
Free Cash Flow method.  This concept should be used exclusively for companies with 
constant and reliable dividend payout policies.   
The estimated future cash flows are discounted at a rate which incorporates the 
opportunity cost of capital for a similar investment in terms of risk and return. The most 
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widely used discount rates are the Cost of Equity and the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC).  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the most common methodology for 
estimating the cost of equity and is defined as:  
Table 3: Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)  
Cost of Equity Risk Free Rate  Levered Beta  Equity Market Risk Premium 
ke        =              rf             +              β              x                    (rf  - rm) 
 
The WACC is a discount rate which incorporates the costs of different sources of 
financing, weighted by the company’s capital structure.  
WACC = D/V * kd * (1-T) + E/V * ke + P/V * kp  
 
According to Koller, Goedhardt & Wessels (2010), the after-tax cost of debt can be 
estimated by the yield to maturity on long-term debt. 
The WACC delivers reliable results when capital structures remain constant over time. 
However, in M&A, additional capital is often raised to finance a transaction and 
therefore capital structures may change frequently. In order to overcome this deficit, 
theory suggests to either calculate a WACC for each year of the explicit period or to use 
the Adjusted Present Value approach (APV). 
The APV method is a popular alternative to the WACC: Among others, Koller, Goedhardt 
& Wessels (2010) recommend the APV approach for changing capital structure 
valuations. According to Luehrman (1997), the APV adds information in comparison to 
the WACC.  
D/V = proportion of total value (V) claimed by debt (D) 
E/V = proportion of total value (V) claimed by equity (E) 
P/V = proportion of total value (V) claimed by preferred stock (P)
kd = required rate of return on debt capital 
ke = required rate of return on equity capital
kp = required rate of return on preferred stocks  
T = marginal corporate tax rate
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The APV method separately valuates operating and financing effects. At a first step, the 
company is valued as if it was financed entirely with equity. After that, the financing 
effects such as interest tax shields, costs of financial distress, subsidies, hedges or issue 
costs are added. Thereby, the different sources of value creation can be evaluated 
separately. 
 
2.2.2 External benchmark approach 
Following the external benchmark valuation approach, the company is worth what other 
market participants are willing to pay for it. The approach requires a high level of 
transparency and market efficiency. In times of bubbles or crises, the external 
benchmark approach is strongly limited and delivers less accurate and fair valuations. 
However, the approach can be a useful tool to get a first insight, how markets assess a 
company.  
 
2.2.3 Analogical approach 
The analogical method or relative valuation method evaluates a company on the basis of 
other companies or transactions, similar in terms of their business and risk and return 
profile. The method implies that a company is worth what other companies or 
transactions are worth. The approach is a popular proxy method because the use is 
straight-forward and quickly applicable. With the use of multiples, either market 
multiples or transaction multiples, the value of a company can be derived from its peer 
group. There are numerous multiples such as revenue, earnings or cash flow multiples.  
Goedhardt, Koller & Wessels (2010) argue that in contrast to net income multiples, cash-
flow multiples are not affected by the capital structure, non-cash charges or taxes. As a 
consequence cash flow multiples deliver more accurate results. Moreover, Sarin, Koeplin 
& Shapiro (2000) see multiples derived from EBIT as a good proxy for free cash flows 
and consequently the most reliable multiple. Kaplan & Ruback (1996) found that 
comparable-based estimates add explanatory power to the Discounted-Cash-Flow 
method. 
The biggest deficit of the analogical method is that peer groups are often not suitable 
and representative.  Furthermore, in the case of transaction multiples, it is often difficult 
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to find similar transactions, especially if the transaction is unique. Market multiples need 
to be coherent in terms of the underlying accounting standards and the definition of the 
multiple itself.  
 
2.2.4 Patrimonial approach 
The Patrimonial method takes into consideration what a company owns. The value is 
determined by the company’s assets and liabilities. The underlying financial statement is 
solely the balance sheet and herein positions are valued by restated net worth 
valuations. This method is a backward looking approach. Nevertheless, it delivers useful 
information in times of bubbles, in which market values may enormously exceed book 
values.  
 
2.3 Mergers & Acquisitions 
2.3.1 Introduction 
According to Reed, Laloux & Nesvold (2007), the difference between a merger and an 
acquisition is that a merger occurs when “a corporation is combined with and 
disappears into another corporation”. An acquisition describes the transfer of 
ownership.  
The reasons for acquiring or merging with other companies to form a new entity are 
numerous. The most important rationale is the creation of additional growth, both by 
additional revenues and by higher profitability (Gaughan 2005). M&As are accomplished 
to create and to implement economies of skill, scale and scope. Apart from that, M&A 
transactions can also be undertaken to improve the financial structure, mainly by tax 
benefits or by taking advantage of additional debt capacity. According to Roberts, 
Wallace & Moles (2010), M&A transactions are driven by inter alia globalization, stock 
markets, political reasons or industry and sector pressure (Appendix 2). 
A profound section how to manage mergers can be found in Appendix 4.   
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2.3.2 M&A characteristics 
2.3.2.1 Transaction types    
 
Damodaran (2002) divides M&A operations into four transaction types:  
1. Merger: A target firm is integrated into the acquiring firm. 
2. Consolidation: A new entity is created by combining the acquiring firm with the 
target firm.  
3. Tender offer: The takeover offer is directly addressed to the shareholders of the 
target firm, bypassing the board of directors.  
4. Acquisition of assets: Selected assets of the target firm are transferred into the 
acquiring firm.  
 
2.3.2.2 Mode of payment  
The mode of payment affects the transaction value. According to Sirower & Sahni (2006), 
stock payments may have negative signaling effects, as the acquirer aims to share the 
risk of materializing synergies with the target. In case the acquirer owns high amounts 
of cash and believes the own company is underpriced, the transaction is predominantly 
financed with cash. Rappaport & Sirower (1999) found out, that on average, cash 
transactions result in higher post transaction shareholder returns.  
2.3.2.3 Target size  
Not only the mode of payment, but also the target size influences the success of a 
transaction. In general, the integration and implementation of synergies is easier for 
smaller firms. Damodaran (2005) mentions the fact, that a merger of equals could be 
more difficult to be successful due to cultural clashes.  
 
2.3.3 Valuating M&A  
Gaughan (2005) classifies mergers into three categories:  
1. Horizontal - Mergers between two competitors.  
2. Vertical - Mergers between companies which have a buyer – seller relationship. 
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3. Conglomerate – Mergers which are neither horizontal nor vertical. 
In order to evaluate a deal as successful and therefore as value adding, the value of the 
merged companies has to exceed or at least equal the sum of the standalone valuations 
of target and acquirer. 
Control and synergies are two possible value sources in M&A. Martin & McConnel 
(1991) described operational synergies and the disciplining of managers of the target 
firm as the key wealth drivers in M&A.  In addition to that, Shivdasani & Zak (2007) 
claim, that the ability to make business decisions is also a value generator.  
Additional value requires the creation and implementation of synergies. Eccles, Lanes & 
Wilson (1999) divide the true value of an acquisition into intrinsic value, market value, 
purchase price and synergy value.  
The concept of true value clearly reveals why it is insufficient to pay the market value for 
an acquisition. To compensate target shareholders, a premium to the market value is 
indispensable. Furthermore, the acquirer shareholders would not accept an acquisition 
if they did not benefit from value transfer to their own. Consequently, the internal 
valuation, including synergies has to exceed the purchase price.  
 






Value GAP Value to 
target shareholders
Value to acquirer 
shareholders
Purchase Price
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Nevertheless, the question why bidders pay abnormal synergy premiums emerges?6 
Damodaran (2005) suggests three reasons:  
First, the biased evaluation process creates conflict of interests and leading advisors fail 
in thoroughly evaluating the synergies. Second, the M&A business is a people business, 
so that managerial hubris, such as managerial pride or personal bidding competition, is 
a reason for misevaluating synergies. Third, companies do not have adequate plans for 
delivering the synergy and they overestimate the transaction potential before the 
transaction.  
Eccles, Lanes & Wilson (1999) classify synergies into five types: cost savings, revenue 
enhancements, process improvements, financial engineering and tax benefits.  
Cost savings is the most common type of synergy and tend to be high in horizontal 
mergers. There are two common problems which come along with synergies through 
cost savings: First, the definition and consequently the categorization of costs differ 
across companies. Second, acquirers tend to be too optimistic in terms of eliminating 
corporate or divisional administrative costs.  
Revenue enhancements are generated from the combination of different strengths of 
acquirer and target and they appear when it is possible to achieve a higher level of sales 
growth. Like cost savings, synergies from revenue enhancements are difficult to be 
estimated because they are strongly affected by external factors, such as the combined 
customer base or competitors reaction to the acquisition.  
Process Enhancements result both, in cost savings and revenue enhancements by 
transferring best practices and core competencies from one company to another.  
Financial benefits through reducing the cost of capital, optimizing the funding access or 
improving capital and cash management can be another advantage of a merger and may 
result in remarkable synergies.  
Synergies resulting from tax benefits are one of the most difficult synergies to assess and 
often a barrier to justify a deal. The overall goal is to keep the overall tax rate of the 
                                                          
6
 Average acquisition premium for all deals since 2005: 28% - data source: Bloomberg 
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combined company equal or below the blended tax rates of the target and acquirer 
before the deal.  
The value of each synergy depends on the particular implementation skills of the 
acquirer. The ability to integrate the target´s assets remarkably coins the success of a 
deal. In conclusion, the valuation of synergies is often controversially discussed and for 
external parties, it is may be difficult to understand why high premiums are paid. 
Besides that, it may take years to observe the real outcome of an M&A transaction which 
makes an assessment at the completion date inappropriate. Damodaran (2005) comes to 
the conclusion that mergers are “often promised and seldom delivered”.  
 
2.3.4 Cross-Border M&A  
The popularity of cross-border M&A has been significantly increasing since the 1990s 
and the globalization waves. From around $100 billion in the late 1980s to $720 billion 
in 1999, the value of cross border M&A reached almost $800 billion in 2013. Over the 
last 10 years, cross-border deals accounted for as much as 30 to 50% of all M&A deals. 
Interestingly, since 2005, cross-border deals have been requiring on average 5% more 
premium than all M&A deals did (Appendix 3).7 Higher premiums might reveal that 
cross-border targets are attractive - acquirers are willing to pay more. Cross-border 
targets could also be underpriced and relatively cheap. However, higher premiums also 
signal higher risks – mainly economical (currency instability, volatility instability), 
political and infrastructural (Marsh, Mercer, & Kroll, 2008). Another reason for higher 
premiums may be target shareholders requiring a premium to accept the deal to be 
compensated for potential skepticism.  
Increasing globalization has created a substantial appetite for international growth over 
the last 20 years. Acquiring firms with the primary goal of developing new markets, 
applying new technologies or attracting new customers beyond own business areas 
have become an indispensable part of M&A.  
Cross-border valuation requires special treatment of tax rates (domestic versus foreign), 
currencies and differences in accounting standards or risks such as foreign exchange or 
political risk in general.  
                                                          
7
 Data source: Bloomberg 
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Interestingly, cross-border transactions are predominantly cash financed because of tax, 
legal and flow back limitations, associated with stock payments.  
Furthermore, cross-border M&A requires special management of currency risk, which 
can be classified into three stages:  
1. Pre-Close risk: Fluctuations between the signing of the deal and the final closing.  
2. At-Close risk: Refers to the repatriation of the cash flows of the target company 
(e.g. dividends or inter-company loan interest). 
3. Post-Close risk: Risk which arises after the transaction, such as cost vs. revenue 
mismatches, transnational risk (accounting differences) or risk, related to 
ongoing cross-border cash flow.   
Zenner, Matthews, Marks and Mago (2008) characterized the following driving and 
hindering forces for cross-border M&A transactions: 
 
Table 4: Driving and hindering forces for cross-border M&A transactions 
 
The valuation of cross-border transactions is more complex than in domestic scenarios. 
Multiple and comparable valuation methods may have limited application because 
comparable companies or transactions do not easily incorporate specificities such as 
synergies, risk or taxes in the context of cross- border valuations.  Zenner, Matthews, 




Forces Driving cross-border M&A Forces Hindering cross-border M&A 
Long-Term drivers Protectionist Ssentiments 
Globalization Tax Complexities 
Diversification Cultural Factors 




Reduced Domestic Competition 
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Table 5: Valuing cross-border mergers (Zenner, Matthews, Marks & Mago 2008) 
 
The authors also found out that, at least in the short run, cross-border acquirers tend to 
outperform domestic acquirers. One of the reasons is the way of financing the deal. 
Cross-border deals are predominantly cash deals which have more positive signals than 
stock deals. 
In normal market environments, premiums paid for cross-border deals are only 
moderately higher than the average premium for all deals. However, in stressed markets, 
the premium is significantly higher (Appendix 3). This phenomenon reveals that cross-
border deals incorporate more risk and therefore require an additional premium. Over 
the last 10 years, the premium was around 33% for cross-border transactions, 
compared to 28% for all deals.8 
 
2.3.5 Does M&A add or destroy value? 
As firms often pay high premiums and have post-transaction difficulties in implementing 
synergies, the fashionable view on mergers is that “M&A is a loser´s game” and 
consequently M&A destroys value (Grubb and Lamb 2000). 
Why do firms still like tapping into the M&A market and accept abnormal prices for 
potential targets if the game is a “loser´s game”? The fashionable view appears to be 
wrong and M&A pays on average, according to Bruner (2004). Recent research about the 
success of M&A deals often do not use a representative sample of M&A deals leading to 
the bias that a few extremely unprofitable deals distort the findings. In addition to that, 
                                                          
8
 Data source: Bloomberg 
Approach A Approach B 
1. Estimation of future cash 
flows in foreign currency
Estimation of future cash 
flows in foreign currency 
2. Discount cash flows with 
target/local WACC
Conversion of cash flows to 
home currency
3. Convert Net Present Value at 
the spot foreign exchange 
rate 
Discount cash flows with 
acquirer/home WACC
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the net economic gain, either the weighted average returns or the absolute dollar value 
returns of acquirer and target as a sum, is predominantly positive. Moreover, the asset 
productivity of the acquiring firms, measured as higher operating cash flows relative to 
peers, improved significantly after the deals. Solely looking at the post-merger share 
price to measure the profitability of mergers appears to be incompletely wrong. Bruner 
(2004) suggests the investor´s required rate of return as a benchmark and defines a 
value created merger as a transaction, in which the investor´s investment return exceeds 
the required rate of return.   
 
2.3.6 M&A Market Trends  
In 2013, global M&A deal volume increased by 12% and the number of deals by 2% 
compared to 2012. In 2014, the M&A market is on a significant upward trend. For the 
first time since the second quarter of 2007, the quarterly volume in Q2 2014 was above 
a trillion US-Dollars. Compared to the first three months of 2013, total deal count 
increased by 20% and volume by as much as 70% (Chart 2). Companies have increasing 
confidence in M&A and less uncertainty and fear for new deals. According to an Ernst & 
Young Survey, the appetite for M&A is on a 5-year-high (Baigorri 2015). Moreover, the 
acquisition premium which is often considered a good indicator for transaction risk is 
with 20%-25% significantly lower and less fluctuating than in the years after the crises 
(Appendix 3).  
The reason for the positive market sentiment and recovery of the M&A market can be 
explained by a reviving world economy, historically low interest rates and as a 
consequence high cash balances companies are holding.  
According to the KPMG 2014 M&A Outlook Survey Report, the main reasons of acquiring 
other firms are opportunistic (i.e. targets appear to be cheap and become available) and 
the expansion of customer bases and geographic reach. Entering into new lines of 
businesses or products are less important reasons. Industries with structural changes 
and in which regulations are prevalent such as Technology/Media/Telecom and 
Healthcare/Pharmaceuticals but also Energy/Oil & Gas are expected to be most 
attractive for M&A deals in 2014. 
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Chart 2: M&A total deal volume in $ and total deal count by quarter 
 
 
In terms of regions, developing countries are expected to be attractive target regions 
since the high growth potential, but also the opportunity to gain technological knowhow 
lures acquirers from developed countries (Marsh, Mercer & Kroll 2008).  
Nevertheless, as M&A appear in waves of activity, regulatory and political reforms, 
technological changes, fluctuations in financial markets, the role of leadership and 
tension between scale and focus (B. Wasserstein, 1998) can quickly change the current 
overall positive market sentiment.   
3. Company and industry background  
3.1 Company Profile Siemens 
Siemens is a German engineering and manufacturing company, positioned along the 
electrification value chain. The company was founded in 1847, employs 343.000 people 
and operates in 190 countries9. Albeit more than half of the revenue is generated in 
Europe, Siemens has strong business activities overseas, both in Asia and Americas. In 
2014, Asia & Australia and Americas accounted for 20% and 26% of the overall revenue.  
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The Munich-headquartered global player divides its business into the four core divisions 
Energy, Infrastructure and Cities, Industry and Healthcare and the following nine sub-
divisions:  
Energy - Power and Gas: 
The Power and Gas division serves customers such as utilities, independent power 
producers, engineering, procurement or construction companies with power generation, 
using fossil or renewable fuels for energy production. With more than €12.5 billion in 
revenue, operating income of €2.2 billion and operating profit margins above 17%10, 
Power & Gas is one of the most important components of Siemens´ business portfolio. 
Wind Power and Renewables:  
Wind Power and Renewables delivers clean, renewable energy from offshore and 
onshore installations. As the segment serves both, business and environmental needs, it 
helps Siemens to be well positioned for the energy transformation process from fossil 
fuels to environmental friendly renewable energy solutions. Although this segment has 
limited profitability yet, it has high strategic future potential. 
Energy - Power Generation Services:    
Power Generation Services include factory or field services support, maintenance, 
repairs, replacements, modernizations and upgrades of components. The division is one 
of the leading service partners worldwide and helps utility firms, oil & gas and industrial 
processing industries to optimize their business. 
Energy - Energy Management:  
Energy Management offers clients products, systems, solutions and services for 
economical and reliable transmission and distribution of electrical power. Although the 
division had more than €10 billion revenue in 2014, it is critical for Siemens because of 
the lack of profitability. Operating Income was negative in 2014.  
 
 
                                                          
10
 Data Source: Bloomberg, Financial year 2014 
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Energy - Building Technologies: 
Building Technologies is the world market leader for safe, energy efficient and 
environmentally friendly buildings and infrastructure. The sub-division offers e.g. fire 
safety, security, building automation, heating or ventilation and air conditioning.  
Infrastructure and Cities - Mobility: 
This segment is responsible for the efficient and integrated transportation of people and 
goods by rail and road. Apart from the full range of vehicles, the mobility section offers 
infrastructure efficiency solutions such as signal and control technologies or road traffic 
control and information systems.  
Industry - Digital Factory:  
Digital Factory is responsible for providing hardware, software and technology-based 
services to support companies in their manufacturing process. The segment is highly 
profitable with operating margins above 18% (2014) and consequently absolutely 
crucial for Siemens’ business portfolio.  
Industry - Process Industries and Drives 
Process Industries and Drives supports the client in improving reliability, safety and 
efficiency of products, processes and plants and provides additional value for customers. 
In 2014, revenues were almost reaching €10 billion, however profitability was relatively 
low with around 8%.  
Healthcare 
Siemens’ Healthcare segment forms one of the world´s largest suppliers of technology to 
the healthcare industry and is a leader in medical imaging, laboratory diagnostics and 
healthcare IT. Moreover, Healthcare provides clinical consulting and training. The 
division had 43.000 employees worldwide, revenue worth €11.7 billion and profits of 
more than €2 billion in the fiscal year 2014. Consequently, Healthcare is substantial for 
Siemens´ portfolio.  
A detailed profitability overview of Siemens’ segments can be found in Appendix 6. 
MASTER THESIS | MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS | SIEMENS – DRESSER-RAND | ANDREAS SCHARF | 2015 
- 18 - 
 
From a financial point of view, Siemens had been able to stabilize its profitability over 
the last five years. With constant sales figures and increasing net profits (CAGR of 16% 
from 2009 to 2013), Siemens managed to sustainably overcome the implications of the 
financial crisis (Table 6). 
Siemens Total Debt/Total Capital Ratio had been relatively constant between 38% and 
43% over the last five years, which is in line with the competitors’ average of 37%.11 In 
addition to that, the company has remarkably cheap access to debt and currently 
refinances itself with a weighted cost of market debt at 1.37%12 (Appendix 7).     




On September 1, 2014 common equity was worth €84.205 million and Siemens’ stock 
price had been outperforming the benchmark Index DAX 30 since January 2010 (Chart 
3). The company’s historic stock prices have a beta with the DAX 30 index of 0.70.13  
 
 
                                                          
11
 Average Total Debt / Total Capital Ratio Peer Group Siemens, as of August, 28 2014 
12 Calculated as weighted yield to maturity by notional amount, converted into Euro as of 01.09.2014 
13
 Beta calculated with five year weekly return data (Appendix 12) 
Siemens - Consolidated Data (€ Million) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 CAGR 
Financials 
Sales 76.651 68.978 73.515 78.296 75.874 0%
EBITDA 9.196 9.262 10.755 9.614 8.099 -3%
EBITDA Margin 12,0% 13,4% 14,6% 12,3% 10,7%
EBIT 6.272 6.946 8.105 6.778 5.838 -2%
EBIT Margin 8,2% 10,1% 11,0% 8,7% 7,7%
Net Profit 2.292 3.899 6.835 5.053 4.087 16%
Profit Margin 3,0% 5,7% 9,3% 6,5% 5,4%
Cash & Near Cash 10.159 14.108 12.468 10.891 9.190 -2%
Total Assets 94.926 102.827 104.243 108.280 101.938 2%
Working Capital 7.124 9.569 9.253 9.492 9.070 6%
Long Term Debt 18.940 17.497 14.280 16.880 18.509 -1%
Ratios 
Return on Assets 2% 4% 6% 4% 4% 14%
Return on Common Equity 9% 14% 21% 13% 15% 14%
Current Ratio 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1%
Quick Ratio 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,7 1%
Total Debt/Total Capital 41,8 42,3 38,6 41,4 43,4 1%
Total Debt/Total Equity 72,0 73,3 62,8 70,5 76,7 2%
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The Munich-based firm has 882 million shares outstanding and a free float of 85.9%. The 
largest shareholders are Siemens Family (6%), Blackrock (6%), Qatar Holdings (3%) 
and Norges Investment Management (2%).14 







As of September 2014 
In order to attain inorganic growth, Siemens regularly taps into the M&A market with a 
focus on smaller to medium sized targets. The most remarkable deals by value since 
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2010 are Invensys Rail LTD (GBP 1.742 million), Connectors and Measurements 
Divisions (€470 million) and Siteco Lighting GmbH (GBP 254 million). Since the 
company is operating on a global basis, acquisition targets are predominantly foreign 
companies. Siemens thereby gains access to new markets and is able to realize growth. 
Strategic Outlook: 
In the context of the strategic focus “Vision 2020”, Siemens’ goals for the near future 
are:15   
1. Driving Performance by cost reduction and business excellence (cost reduction of 
€1 billion). 
2. Underperforming businesses fixed.  
3. Solid execution of financial target system:  
a. Capital efficiency: ROCE 15-20%. 
b. Growth > most relevant competitors.  
4. Global and decentralized management structures. 
5. Partners of choice for customers (Net Promoter Score16 up by >= 20%). 
6. Employer of choice (Siemens Engagement Survey. Employee Engagement Index, 
Leadership and Diversity Index: >75%). 
7. Ownership culture: Increase the number of employee shareholders by at least 50%. 
 
3.2 Company Profile Dresser-Rand  
Dresser-Rand is a Houston based global manufacturer of oil and natural gas equipment 
and service provider. The company´s products and services include the fields of oil and 
gas production, high pressure field injection and enhanced oil recovery pipelines, 
refinery processes, natural gas processing and petrochemical production. Apart from 
that, Dresser-Rand operates in the market of power generation and its associated 
technologies such as biomass, waste-to-energy or compressed air energy storage. The 
company was founded in the mid-1800s and went public in 2005.  
                                                          
15
 Siemens – Vision 2020, JP Morgan Pan-European Capital Goods CEO Conference, June 2014 
16
 Net Promoter Score (NPS) measures the loyalty that exists between a provider and a consumer  
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The business is divided into New Equipment and Aftermarket Parts and Services. New 
Equipment e.g. includes steam turbines, gas turbines or centrifugal and reciprocating 
compressors. Aftermarket Parts and Services offers the whole spectrum of service and 
support such as replacement parts, equipment installation or product training.  Sales for 
both areas are almost at the same level of around $1.5 billion. However, the Aftermarket 
Parts and Services segment is more profitable with profit margins of around 20%, twice 
as high as in New Equipment.  Moreover, the Aftermarket Parts and Services segment is 
less sensitive to business cycles and therefore Dresser’s attractive business segment.  





    New Units Aftermarket Parts and Services  
The company operates on a global basis, earning more than two thirds of its revenue 
outside the domestic market, North America. Apart from North America (32%), Europe 
(24%) and Latin America (16%) are the most important markets in terms of revenue.17 
With respect to revenue by End-Markets, Gas Transmission accounts for 43% of the 
revenue followed by Refining and Chemical (25%) and Oil & Gas Production (21%).  
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16% Europe 24% 
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income  
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Dresser-Rand - Consolidated Data ($ Million) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 CAGR 
Financials 
Sales 2.290 1.954 2.312 2.736 3.033 7%
EBITDA 400 315 338 421 413 1%
EBITDA Margin 17,5% 16,1% 14,6% 15,4% 13,6%
EBIT 349 263 257 336 321 -2%
EBIT Margin 15,2% 13,4% 11,1% 12,3% 10,6%
Net Profit 211 160 130 179 168 -5%
Profit Margin 9,2% 8,2% 5,6% 6,5% 5,6%
Cash & Near Cash 223 421 128 123 190 -4%
Total Assets 2150 2314 3064 3354 3738 15%
Working Capital 351 415 218 393 766 22%
Long Term Debt 370 370 990 1015 1247 35%
Ratios 
Return on Assets 10% 7% 4% 6% 5% -17%
Return on Common Equity 24% 14% 12% 18% 14% -12%
Current Ratio 1,6 1,6 1,2 1,4 1,8 3%
Quick Ratio 0,9 1,1 0,6 0,7 0,9 2%
Total Debt/Total Capital 26,8 25,4 54,1 49,0 49,7 17%
Total Debt/Total Equity 36,5 34,0 117,9 96,0 98,9 28%
Over the last five years, Dresser-Rand had been able to increase sales by 7% annually. 
Nonetheless, net profit was not in line with the sales increase. Furthermore, the 
company had a constantly increasing level of debt. Total Debt to Total Capital increased 
by 85% and Long Term Debt by even 237% over the last five years.   










On September 1, 2014 Dresser-Rand’s common equity was worth $5.3 billion. The firm´s 
biggest shareholders were Blackrock (8.42%), Vanguard Group (6.14%) and Janus 
Capital Management (6.07%).   
The shares of Dresser-Rand significantly outperformed its benchmarks. In particular, 
over the last six months, Dresser-Rand performed better than the Dow Jones, Dow Jones 
Sub index for Oil and Gas and the S&P Oil and Gas Equipment and Services Select 
Industry Index. The stock price of Dresser-Rand may have already incorporated 
takeover rumors.  Dresser-Rand’s beta with the S&P Index is 1.47 (Appendix 12). The 
company’s payout policy focuses on retaining earnings instead of paying dividends. 
Since the IPO in 2005, there has not been any dividend payment.  
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3 months 6 months 1 years 2 years 3 years 4 years 
Dresser Rand +13,23% +27,6% +13,7% +36,9% +63,3% +95,1%
Dow Jones Industrial Index +2,3% +4,8% +15,4% +30,6% +47,2% +70,7%
Dow Jones Subindex -  US Oil&Gas +2,6% +12,1% +18,8% +33% +49,2% +85,6%
S&P Oil&Gas Equipment and 
Services Select Industry Index







SPSIOS Index WTI BRENT Dresser-Rand
       WTI Brent 
SPSIOS Index  0,65 0,05 
Dresser-Rand  0,54 -0,03 





Dresser-Rand’s business model highly depends on the oil industry market sentiment. 
Consequently, the financial success of Dresser-Rand is linked to oil prices. A three-year 
correlation analysis based on weekly returns reveals that the stock of Dresser-Rand is 
correlated with WTI-oil (+ 0.54). Interestingly, Dresser-Rand’s shares are not correlated 
with Brent-oil (-0.03). This phenomenon can be explained by the fact, that Dresser-Rand 
is an American based firm and their business focuses on the American type of oil - WTI.  
Since July 2014, when oil prices started to decrease and rumors of Siemens’ takeover 
plan could have been in the market, the stock price movement has been more volatile 
and correlation with WTI is less positive. (Chart 7) 
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The firm’s key strategic objectives are: 
1. Increase Sales of Aftermarket Parts and Services to the Existing Installed Base. 
2. Expand Aftermarket Parts and Services Business to Non-Dresser-Rand 
Equipment. 
3. Grow Alliances. 
4. Expand Performance-Based Long-Term Service Contracts. 
5. Introduce New and Innovative Products and Technologies. 
6. Improve Profitability. 
7. Selectively Pursue Acquisitions. 
 
3.3 Oil & Gas Equipment and Services Industry 
The Oil & Gas Equipment and Services Industry operates as a supplier for the Oil & Gas 
Refinery and Extraction Industry. The industry is closely related to the economic 
condition of its clients and therefore to oil and gas prices. The S&P Sub index, Oil & Gas 
Equipment and Services18 has a relatively strong three year correlation coefficient with 
WTI (+0.65).19 Consequently, WTI-oil can be considered one of the main industry 
drivers and makes the industry cyclical and volatile (Chart 7). 
Although the share of Oil & Gas in total consumption decreased from 62% in 1973 to 
56% in 2012, Oil & Gas is still the most consumed fuel worldwide and supplies 
approximately 5000Mtoe (Chart 8).20   
Demand for Oil & Gas has been steadily increasing. Unconventional extraction methods 
such as hydraulic fracturing have made gas more attractive and new resources became 
available. Interestingly, the excess capacity is significantly higher for oil than for gas. 
Since 2007, the demand for gas has been exceeding the supply (Appendix 8). Until 2035, 
it is expected that renewable energy and natural gas meet approximately 66% of 
incremental energy demand.21  As Fossil Fuels are limited, new technologies and 
extraction and refinery methods will play a more substantial role in the future. There is 
a huge demand for highly specialized equipment. The Oil & Gas Field Equipment 
                                                          
18
 Bloomberg Ticker SPSIOS Index 
19
 Correlation measured with 3-year-weekly returns 
20
 International Energy Agency, 2012 
21
 International Energy Agency forecasts  4672 Mtoe 
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Industry is a key part in the Oil & Gas value chain and can be considered the key future 
driver of the whole Oil & Gas industry.     
Chart 8: Fuel shares of total final consumption (1973 vs. 2012) 
 
Data Source: International Energy Agency, 2012 
Applying the concept of Porter’s five forces to analyze the level of competition within the 
industry helps to find out, that the competitive rivalry in the Oil & Gas Equipment and 
Services Industry is relatively low (Appendix 9):  
Threat of new Entrants: 
The threat of new entrants can be considered low, as multiple high entry barriers exist. 
The industry is characterized by high capital and technological requirements and a need 
for highly specialized workers and industry know how. Moreover, strict and long-term 
refinery extraction service rights and contracts, as well as economies of scale available 
for existing firms hampers new entries. Companies being active in the Oil & Gas 
Equipment and Services Industry have to follow strict regulatory and legal restrictions. 
Product patents, hydraulic fracturing laws are other restrictions which lower the 
attractiveness for new market participants. Environmental burdens play a more 
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Bargaining Power of Buyers: 
Buyers for the Oil & Gas Equipment and Services Industry are e.g. the big Oil & Gas 
extraction and refinery firms such as Exxon Mobile, BP or Shell. Their buying power is 
limited, as the size of the order is normally relatively small and products are highly 
specialized. In particular, aftermarket parts and services serve niche demands. In 
addition to that, high switching costs, low buyer’s price sensitivity and the lack of 
alternative energy equipment solutions make the buyer relatively powerless.  
 
Bargaining Power of Suppliers: 
Suppliers for the industry are providers of raw materials such as steel, aluminum, or 
iron. These materials have low levels of specialization and market concentration. As a 
result, members of the Oil & Gas Equipment and Services Industry can easily change 
suppliers due to low switching costs. Consequently, the Bargaining Power of Suppliers is 
low. This result changes, when suppliers provide more specialized products with higher 
technical requirements e.g. computer systems, hardware or software. These kinds of 
suppliers tend to have stronger power than the raw material suppliers. 
 
Threat of Substitutes: 
Within the Oil & Gas Equipment and Services Industry itself, the threat of substitutes is 
low because of the high specialization level. Services are related to specific facilities and 
are therefore unique. Substitutes are rare. This changes when we consider substitutes 
for Oil & Gas. Multiple alternatives like coal, wind power or nuclear energy exist and 
form a strong potential threat of substitutes – in terms of energy type substitutes. As 
long as alternative energy types (Renewable Energy types) are not able to provide 
enough supply to serve the high level of demand, fossil fuels like Oil & Gas remain the 
most important energy type and the industry remains profitable (Chart 8). In the near 
future, the threat of substitutes outside the Oil & Gas Industry is manageable. However, 
it might become a serious threat in the future. 
 
Competitive Rivalry:  
On the one hand, high buyer’s switching costs, high product differentiation and a lack of 
numerous competitors of equal size and strength create an environment of low 
competitiveness. On the other hand, high exit barriers and high fixed costs foster 
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competitiveness. Overall, the low competitive rivalry factors outweigh the high 
competitive rivalry factors. Hence the rivalry is relatively low. Moreover, the industry is 
less dynamic due to long-term contracts and slow decision maker processes (Laws, 
governmental or political negotiations).  
 
3.4 Deal Rationale 
1. Technological opportunities  
Chakrabarti, Hauschildt & Süverkrüp (1994) as well as Sleuwaegen & Valentini (2006) 
stress the fact that innovation and technology changes foster M&A activity. Through 
M&A, firms are better and quicker able to fill gaps in their technological portfolio and to 
keep pace with the faced-paced technological environment. Internal development is less 
profitable according to Capron & Mitchell (2009). A deal would enable Siemens to enter 
the high-speed engine technology market. In the Oil & Gas Industry the current trend 
goes towards liquefied natural gas (LNG). Siemens could participate in the profitable 
hydraulic fracturing method, by which fluid is injected into cracks to force them further 
open. This technology uncovers huge new supply. Nevertheless, it is controversially 
discussed due to environmental scruple. In many other countries such as Siemens’ home 
market Germany, it is prohibited above a soil level of 3000m22. Not adopting this 
technique in today’s world of Oil & Gas business means competitive disadvantages on a 
global basis and therefore the acquisition of Dresser-Rand is paramount to the future 
success of Siemens Oil & Gas Business. 
 
2. Additional growth opportunities  
Acquiring Dresser-Rand could also mean expanding the area of growth – both in terms 
of regions and applications (up-/down-stream).  With Dresser-Rand, Siemens would be 
able to utilize "home market" advantage in the United States and Siemens could become 
a world class provider for the growing Oil & Gas market. An acquisition could help 
Siemens to strengthen its US presence – the most important region in the Oil & Gas 
business. Dresser-Rand would be most efficient for Siemens by implementing the 
business into the Power & Gas, as well as the Power Generation Services segment. 
Without synergies, Siemens could increase sales by additional $3 billion (2013) – an 
                                                          
22
 As of September 2014 
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increase for the Power & Gas segment by almost 25%. Given a successful post-merger 
implementation, the two relevant segments could take advantage of Dresser-Rand’s high 
profit margins. In particular the highly profitable segment of Aftermarket Parts and 
Services with profit margins of around 20% is attractive for Siemens.  
 
3. Beneficial window of opportunity:  
According to Becker-Blease, Golderberg and Kaen (2008), industry shocks coin and 
trigger M&A transactions. In the business of Oil & Gas, decreasing oil prices can be 
considered an industry shock or at least a factor which strongly affects the industry. As 
Dresser-Rand’s business is positively correlated with WTI-oil, decreasing prices (WTI 
decreased by 10% between June, 13 2014 and August, 29 201423) could make the target 
attractive, regarding the acquisition price. The overall aspiring and positive sentiment in 
the current M&A environment supports the timing of a potential transaction. The 
opportunity of buying an attractive potential strategic fit at a good price at the right time 
plays a key role in the deal rationale.   
 
4. Strategic Fit for other recent transactions – Optimizing Portfolio   
Another good reason to acquire Dresser-Rand can be found in Siemens’ acquisition 
strategy. The company is in acquisition talks with Rolls-Royce Energy gas turbine and 
compressor business. An acquisition of Dresser-Rand could complete a potential Rolls-
Royce transaction and could be used to increase overall efficiency by economies of skill, 
scale and scope. In particular the strong Aftermarket Parts and Services division fits into 
the portfolio of Siemens’ energy division.  After the failed bid for Alstom, the French 
global leader in power generation, power transmission and rail infrastructure, Siemens 
appetite for acquisitions to complete the plan to become a global leader in the Gas 
Business is huge. From a strategic point of view, the acquisition of Dresser-Rand fits into 
Siemens’ strategy and looks at a first glance advantageous.  
                                                          
23
 Data Source: Thomson Reuters 
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4. Valuation 
4.1 Siemens  
4.1.1 Financial Projections  
EBIT and EBITDA forecasts are optimistic for all of the next three years with Compound 
Annual Growth Rates (CAGRs) from 2013 – 2016 of 9.3% and 10.5%. Sales are expected 
to grow in line with the 3.4% world GDP growth rate forecasted for 2014 (Statista 2015). 
Two cost reduction programs help the Munich-based company to increase its 
profitability, while having moderate sales growth.  “Siemens 2014” – a €6 billion savings 
program - will affect financial data from 2014 onwards. Furthermore, with respect to its 
long term strategic program “Vision 2020”, Siemens wants to reduce overhead and 
support function costs by approximately €1 billion through removing additional layers 
(cluster, sectors), combining certain divisions and businesses and optimizing corporate 
services.  
Table 9: Siemens – Income Statement projections 
 
 
In addition to that, Siemens plans to increase efficiency by inorganic growth. In the past, 
Siemens’ acquisition targets have had high profitability business models, which have 
helped the firm to increase its overall efficiency and to overcome short term market and 
business turbulences.  
Depreciation and Capital expenditures depend on the following relation:  
  PPEt = PPEt-1 + capital expenditures – depreciation 
  Capital expenditures = PPEt - PPEt-1 + depreciation 
Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) as a percentage of sales is expected to remain 
constant at the historic five-year-average of 14%. As depreciation is linked to PPE, I 
(€ million) 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e CAGR 
Net Sales 73.515 78.296 75.874 78.454 81.121 83.879 3,4%
Operating Expenses 62.760 68.682 67.775 68.239 70.559 72.958 2,5%
EBITDA 10.755 9.614 8.099 10.215 10.562 10.921 10,5%
Depreciation & Amortization 2.650 2.836 2.261 3.075 3.180 3.288 13,3%
EBIT 8.105 6.778 5.838 7.139 7.382 7.633 9,3%
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assumed depreciation to constantly develop at the five-year depreciation as a % of PPE 
average of 28%.    
In perpetuity, capital expenditures equal depreciation, which implies a non-growing 
business state.  
Table 10: Siemens – Capital Expenditures & Depreciation projections 
 
 
When forecasting operating working capital, I assumed all asset items to remain at their 
respective 5-year-average percentage-of-sales-ratio in the future (Appendix 10).  
Siemens’ high working capital indicates short-term financial health – the company is 
capable of covering its short term debt with short term assets. Despite that, a high 
working capital may also indicate that the company has either too much inventory or 
does not efficiently invest excess cash.   
Table 11: Siemens – Working Capital projections   
 
 
4.1.1.2 Divestment Bosch Siemens Hausgeräte (B/S/H/) 
At the beginning of September 2014, the rumor that Siemens plans to sell its 50% stake 
in B/S/H/ was in the markets. B/S/H/ – a joint venture between Siemens and Bosch - is 
the largest manufacturer of home appliances in Europe and one of the leading 
companies worldwide. Siemens considers a divestment due to a lack of synergies to 
their business in technology or go-to-market. Moreover, the joint venture faced 
(€ million) 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e
PPE 9.815 10.984 11.357 11.743 12.142 12.555 12.982 13.423 13.880
Sales 75.874 78.454 81.121 83.879 86.731 89.680 92.729 95.882 99.142
PPE % of sales 13% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14%
Capex 1.869 4.244 3.553 3.674 3.799 3.928 4.062 4.200 4.343
Depreciation 2.261 3.075 3.180 3.288 3.400 3.515 3.635 3.759 3.886
as a % of PPE 23% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28%
(€ million) 2013 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Working Capital 9.070 9.082 9.390 9.710 10.040 10.381 10.734 11.099 11.476
Increase in Working 
Capital 
12 309 319 330 341 353 365 377
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increasing competitive pressure from market consolidation. As the likelihood of a 
successful divestment was relatively high, this case proceeds as if B/S/H/ was sold. As a 
consequence, Siemens’ financial figures and forecasts are adjusted by the transaction 
(Appendix 11). According to Siemens Management, Bosch was willing to pay € 3 billion 
in cash and an additional € 250 million dividend and the transaction is expected to be 
closed in summer 2015.  
4.1.2 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation  
4.1.2.1 Free Cash Flow estimation  
Siemens FCFF forecasts without a B/S/H/ divestment from 2014-2021 underlie the 
following assumptions:  
 Sales will grow by 3.4% which equals the expected world GDP growth rate of 
2014 (Statista 2015). 
 EBIT-Margins remain constant at the 3 year average of 9.1%. 
 Tax payments on EBIT equal 27% - the 3 year average effective tax rate.  
 Depreciation equals the 5-year-average of depreciation as a percentage of PPE - 
28% (Table 10). 
 Working Capital requirements are forecasted under the assumption that all 
current Assets and Liabilities will remain its respective 5-year-average-as -a -% -
of -sales ratio in the future (Table 11). 
 Capital Expenditures equal PPEt – PPEt-1 + depreciation (Table 10). 
 Long-Term Growth rate equals 1%. 
 
In perpetuity: 
 EBIT, Sales and Working Capital requirements will grow by 1% (long-term 
growth rate).  
 Tax as a percentage of EBIT will be unchanged. 
 Depreciation equals capital expenditures.  
 Capital expenditures equal the amount in 2021E. 
FCFFs are at a first step calculated as if Siemens would not sell its B/S/H/ stake and at a 
next step FCFFs are adjusted by the divestment.   
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(€ million) 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e Perpetuity
Sales 75.874 78.454 81.121 83.879 86.731 89.680 92.729 95.882 99.142 100.133 
Sales B/S/H/ 5.719 5.966 6.225 6.494 6.775 7.069 7.375 7.448 
Sales ex divestment 75.402 77.913 80.506 83.186 85.954 88.813 91.767 92.685 
EBIT 5.838 7.139 7.382 7.633 7.893 8.161 8.438 8.725 9.022 9.112 
EBIT B/S/H/ 255 338 353 368 384 401 418 436 455 460 
EBIT ex divestment 7.029 7.265 7.508 7.760 8.020 8.289 8.567 8.652 
Tax 1.630 1.928 1.993 2.061 2.131 2.203 2.278 2.356 2.436 2.460 
Tax B/S/H/ 71 101 106 110 115 120 125 131 137 138 
Tax ex divestment 1.887 1.950 2.016 2.083 2.153 2.225 2.299 2.322 
Tax as a % of EBIT -27,9% 27,0% 27,0% 27,0% 27,0% 27,0% 27,0% 27,0% 27,0% 27,0%
NOPAT ex divestment 5.142 5.314 5.493 5.677 5.867 6.064 6.267 6.330 
Depreciation 2.888 3.075 3.180 3.288 3.400 3.515 3.635 3.759 3.886 4.343 
Depreciation B/S/H/ 189 197 205 214 223 233 243 254 265 314 
Depreciation ex divestment 2.975 3.074 3.177 3.282 3.392 3.505 3.622 4.029 
Gross Cash flow ex divestment 8.117 8.388 8.669 8.959 9.259 9.569 9.889 10.359 
Increase in Working Capital -422 12 309 319 330 341 353 365 377 381 
Increase in Working Capital B/S/H/ 163 -6 45 47 49 51 54 56 58 59 
Increase in Working Capital EX divest. 264 272 281 290 299 309 319 322 
Capex -1.869 -4.244 -3.553 -3.674 -3.799 -3.928 -4.062 -4.200 -4.343 -4.343 
Capex B/S/H/ -189 -233 -243 -254 -265 -277 -288 -301 -314 -314 
Capex ex divestment -3.310 -3.420 -3.534 -3.652 -3.773 -3.899 -4.029 -4.029 
Free Cash Flow without B/S/H/ 4.032 4.543 4.696 4.854 5.018 5.186 5.361 5.541 6.008 
Cash Flows from sales of B/S/H/ 3.250 
Free Cash Flow with B/S/H/ 5.649 4.032 4.707 4.867 5.032 5.203 5.380 5.563 5.752 6.271 
Forecast Period
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4.1.2.2 Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
The calculation of an appropriate discount rate – the WACC – is based on certain 
assumptions:  
1. The risk free rate equals the 10 year German Bund yield of 0.88% from 
September 1, 2014.  
2. The Beta of 0.70 is estimated by levering the company’s industry (peer-group) 
beta to the company’s target debt-to-equity ratio (Appendix 12). 
3. Equity Market Risk Premium: 9.55% (Market Return 10.43%24 – Risk Free Rate 
0.88%). 
4. Cost of Debt equals 1.37% - As Siemens is an investment grade rated firm, the 
yield to maturity is a suitable proxy according to Koller, Goedhardt & Wessels 
(2010). I used a weighted yield to maturity by notional amount translated to 
Euro25 of all outstanding traded bonds.26 
5. For the tax rate, the 3-year-average effective tax rate of 27% (2014) is used. 
6. The Capital structure is observed from enterprise and equity market values as of 
September 1, 2014.27 The Equity ratio equals 85% and the debt ratio 15%.  
 
4.1.2.3 DCF base case valuation 
When discounting back the FCFFs28 to the present value at a WACC of 6.54%, the 
enterprise value of Siemens is worth €97.685 million.  After deducting the net debt of 
11.65629, Siemens equity value is worth €86.029 million, which is equivalent to a share 
price of €98.   
 
                                                          
24
 Source: Bloomberg – September 1, 2014 (Bloomberg calculates the Market Return with the Internal Rate of 
Return weighted by the market cap of each index member. It is a forward-looking estimate of market returns. 
The internal rate of return comes from the Dividend Discount Model function, and is based on estimates from 
the Current Consensus function for the first few years. After that, Bloomberg uses a proprietary model for 
growth years) 
25
 Currency translation as of September 1, 2014 (EUR/USD 1.3128) 
26
 Negative YTMs are convereted to zero 
27
 Current Market Cap: €84.205 million and Current Enterprise Value: €99.537 million – data source bloomberg 
28
 Including a divestment  of the 50% stake of B/S/H/ 
29
 Calculated as Long Term Debt 2014e (€21.346 million) + Short Term Debt 2014e (€2.592 million) – Cash & 
Cash Equivalents 2014e (€11.737 million) - Net Financial Debt B/S/H/ (€545 million)  
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Table 13: Summary of Siemens WACC & DCF Valuation 
 
4.1.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Chart 9: Siemens DCF sensitivity analysis   
 
 
The WACC and the long-term growth rate are two of the major value drivers for the DCF 
valuation. As highlighted in Chart 9, the most realistic assumptions for these two 
parameters are WACCs between 6% and 7% and long-term growth rates of 0.75% and 
1.25% (dark blue area). Within these assumptions the company is worth between €86 
and €115. 
WACC Summary DCF Valuation Summary               
    Cost of Debt 1.37% NPV of Cash Flows in € million 97.685
    Cost of Equity 7.54% Net debt in € million 11.656
       Risk free rate 0.88% Equity Value in € million 86.029
       Beta 0.70 Numbers of shares in million 881
       Market Premium 9.55% Equity Value per share in € 97.65
    Marginal tax rate 27% Current share price in € 92.42
    Equity Ratio 85% Upside             +5.7%
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4.1.3 Adjusted Present Value  
Applying the concept of the APV model, namely valuing the company first as if it was all-
equity financed and then adding the Present Value of Interest Tax Shields (ITS), results 
in a price per share of €101, which is 9% above the current market value.  
The APV model takes into consideration two different discount rates. FCFFs are 
discounted at the unlevered cost of equity (6.76%), whereas Interest Tax Shields at the 
cost of debt (1.37%). As interest tax shields can be considered as uncertain as principal 
and interest payments are, the cost of debt reflects the appropriate riskiness for ITS.  
Table 14: Siemens - Adjusted Present Value (APV)  
 
* Discount factor FCFF: unlevered cost of equity = 6.76% [risk free rate (0.88%) + unlevered beta (0.62) x (market premium 9.55%)] 
** Discount factor Interest Tax Shields: Cost of debt = 1.37% 
** 2015 includes €3.250 million cash receipt from the B/S/H/ sale 
 
Year 
Free cash flow 
(€ million)
Interest tax shield 
(€million)
Present value of 
FCFF (€ million)*
Present value of 
ITS (€ million)**
2014 4.032 42 3.776 41 
2015*** 7.793 43 6.837 42 
2016 4.696 45 3.859 44 
2017 4.854 47 3.736 45 
2018 5.018 49 3.617 46 
2019 5.186 52 3.502 48 
2020 5.361 54 3.391 49 
2021 5.541 56 3.283 50 
Continuing value 91.806 15.441 54.391 13.850 
Present Value 86.394 14.215 
Presnet value of FCFF 86.394 
Present value of interest tax shields 14.215 
Present value of FCFF and interest tax shields 100.609 
Less: Value of debt 11.656 
Equity Value 88.952 
Equity Value per share in € 100,97
Δ current Share Price 9,25%
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To obtain a thorough analogical benchmark valuation, a representative peer group of 
companies with similar business activities, similar risk/return profiles and capital 
structures is crucial. Siemens has a peer group of 15 competitors which allows a detailed 
value deviation (Appendix 14). I considered EV/Sales, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and 
Price/Earnings ratios as a good mix of Multiples.    
Table 16: Siemens – Market Multiple Valuation 
 
 
The analogical valuation approach leads to a valuation price per share range of €87 to 
€104. Interestingly, the price earnings ratio as an equity multiple, delivers a significantly 
lower valuation than the current market price. From this perspective, Siemens tends to 
be overvalued. Despite that, valuations derived from enterprise multiples are slightly 
higher than Siemens’ current valuation of €92 a share.  
4.1.5 Valuation Summary 




















EV/Sales 1,26 x Sales 2014e: 78.454 98.590 11.657 86.933 98,68 €     7%
EV/EBITDA 10,13 x EBITDA 2014e: 10.215 103.436 11.657 91.778 104,18 €   13%
EV/EBIT 13,29 x EBIT 2014e: 7.139 94.893 11.657 83.236 94,48 €     2%
Price Earnings Ratio 14,75 x Earnings 2014e: 5.204 76.738 87,10 €     -6%
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In conclusion, Siemens valuation ranges from €87 to €104 a share.  The company tends 
to be undervalued as all valuation methods except for the P/E ratio are above the 
current market valuation of €92.  
The average analyst recommendation price of $101.3030  is at the upper end of the 
valuation range of €87 - €104 and supports the finding that Siemens is currently 
undervalued (Appendix 15). 
 
4.2 Dresser-Rand  
4.2.1 Financial Projections  
Net Sales, EBIT and EBITDA are expected to increase over the next three years. The 
positive outlook in the industry of Oil & Gas Supply, in combination with increasing 
energy demand and increasing demand for environmental energy solutions, set a bright 
future for Dresser-Rand.  The projections are promising with yearly increasing EBITDA 
and EBIT Margins of 14.8% and 17.8% from 2013 to 2016. The company has protected 
its market share over the last several years through superior technology and its value 
proposition.   
Table 17: Dresser-Rand Income Statement projections 
 
In the past, Dresser-Rand’s business model has not been very capital intensive due to a 
lot of outsourcing and capital expenditures are expected to remain at 2.2%31 of sales.  
 
 
                                                          
30
 30 analysts covering Siemens as of September 2014 
31
 5-year-average capital expenditures as a percentage of sales ratio  
($ million) 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e CAGR 
Net Sales 2.312 2.736 3.033 3.254 3.492 3.746 7,3%
Operating Expenses 1.974 2.315 2.619 2.704 2.905 3.122 6,0%
EBITDA 338 421 413 550 586 625 14,8%
Depreciation & Amortization 80 86 92 95 97 100 2,7%
EBIT 257 336 321 456 489 524 17,8%
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($ million) 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e
Sales 3.033 3.254 3.492 3.746 4.020 4.313 4.628 4.966 5.329
Capex 83 72 77 83 89 95 102 110 118
Depreciation & Amortization 92 95 97 100 103 106 110 113 117




depreciation forecasts are based on the assumption that the average operating life of 
rotating equipment is 30 years32 and Dresser-Rand applies a linear depreciation method 
(Appendix 16).  
Net Working Capital is expected to decrease in 2014 and after that to steadily increase. 
Dresser-Rand’s management mentions difficulties in receiving cash payments from 
clients as a reason for inflating Working Capital Requirements. Moreover, Working 
Capital Requirements will rise because of the development of longer-term contracts 
(including installation) which are booked using the percentage-of-completion method.33 
(Appendix 17) 
 







                                                          
32
 As stated in the Annual Report Dresser-Rand 2013 
33
 Dresser-Rand Annual Report 2014 
($ million) 2013 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Net Working Capital 669 481 516 553 594 637 684 734 787
Working Capital 
Requirements 
-188 35 38 40 43 47 50 54
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4.2.2 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation  
4.2.2.1 Free Cash Flow estimation  
In contrast to the matured and well-diversified company Siemens, Dresser-Rand’s 
financial figures are more dynamic. 
Forecast figures from 2014 to 2021 underlie the following main assumptions: 
 Sales will grow by the five-year-average compound annual growth rate of 7.3%.  
 EBIT-Margins will remain constantly high at the 5 year average of 14%. 
 Tax as a % of EBIT equals 33.4% (effective Tax Rate 2009-2013). 
 Depreciation figures are forecasted assuming an average asset life cycle of 30 
years and a straight line depreciation method (Table 18). 
 Working Capital requirements are forecasted considering all current Assets and 
Liabilities will remain its respective 5-year-average as a percentage of sales ratio 
in the future (Table 19 and Appendix 17). 
 Capital Expenditures will increase at the five-year-average capital expenditures 
as a percentage of sales ratio of 2.2% (Table 18). 
 
For the FCFF calculation in perpetuity, I considered a long-term growth rate of 3% 
which equals the world GDP growth.34 Furthermore, I expected Sales, EBIT and Working 
Capital Requirements to increase by the long-term growth rate and tax to keep a 
constant percentage-of-EBIT-ratio of 33.4%. In perpetuity, the company is in a steady 
state and depreciation equals capital expenditures.   
                                                          
34
 Data 2014 – Worldbank  
MASTER THESIS | MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS | SIEMENS – DRESSER-RAND | ANDREAS SCHARF | 2015 
- 40 - 
 
 in $ million 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e Perpetuity 
Free Cash Flow Calculation
Sales 3.033 3.254 3.492 3.746 4.020 4.313 4.628 4.966 5.329 5.488 
Sales growth -0,8% 7,3% 7,3% 7,3% 7,3% 7,3% 7,3% 7,3% 7,3% 3%
EBIT 321 456 489 524 563 604 648 695 746 768 
EBIT margins 10,6% 14,0% 14,0% 14,0% 14,0% 14,0% 14,0% 14,0% 14,0% 14,0%
Tax 88 152 163 175 188 202 216 232 249 257 
Tax as a % of EBIT 27,5% 33,4% 33,4% 33,4% 33,4% 33,4% 33,4% 33,4% 33,4% 33,4%
NOPAT 233 303 326 349 375 402 432 463 497 512 
Depreciation 92 95 97 100 103 106 110 113 117 118 
Gross Cash flow 325 398 423 449 478 508 541 576 614 630 
Working Capital Requirments -373 -188 35 38 40 43 47 50 54 54 
Capex -83 -72 -77 -83 -89 -95 -102 -110 -118 -118 
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) -131 514 311 329 349 370 392 417 443 566 
Explicit Period 
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4.2.2.2 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
The WACC calculation is based on certain assumptions:  
1. As Dresser-Rand is an American firm with main business activities in North 
America, the risk free rate equals the yield for the 10 year U.S. Government Bond 
as of September 1, 2014 – 2.34%. 
2. The Beta of 1.47 is calculated by levering the company’s industry (Peer-group) 
beta to the company’s target debt-to-equity ratio (Appendix 12). 
7. Equity Market Risk Premium: 7.25% (Market Return 9.59%35 – Risk Free Rate 
2.34%). 
3. The Cost of Debt will be 6.5% - derived from the only marketable bond ($375 
million, 2021, 6.5%).  
4. The Tax Rate equals 33.4%.  
5. The Capital structure is obtained from enterprise and equity market values as of 
September 1, 2014.  The market value of equity of $5.263 million and the 
enterprise value of $6.362 million36 result in an equity ratio of 83% and a debt 
ratio of 17%.  
 
4.2.2.3 DCF base case valuation 
Table 21: Summary of Dresser-Rand WACC & DCF Valuation 
 
 
                                                          
35
 Source: Bloomberg – September 1, 2014  
36
 Data Source: Bloomberg – September 1, 2014 
WACC Summary DCF Valuation Summary               
    Cost of Debt 6.50% NPV of Cash Flows in $ million 4.738
    Cost of Equity 12.96% Net debt in $ million 1.089
       Risk free rate 2.34% Equity Value in $ million 3.650
       Beta 1.47 Numbers of shares in million 77
       Market Premium 7.25% Equity Value per share in $ 47.52
    Marginal tax rate 33% Current share price in $ 68.36
    Equity Ratio 83% Upside -30%
    Debt Ratio 17%
WACC 11.53%
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According to the DCF Model, Dresser-Rand is worth $48 a share. When deducting the net 
debt of $1.089 million37 from the enterprise value of $4.738, the total equity value is 
worth $3.650 million. The valuation is 30% lower than the current market price of $68. 
The mismatch can be explained by already incorporated, potential takeover 
speculations38 and a general optimistic oil- and oil supply industry valuation.   
4.2.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
When calculating the different values for Dresser-Rand, while changing the parameters 
WACC and EBIT-Margins, Dresser-Rand’s most appropriate valuation range can be 
defined between $40 and $56 (dark blue area).  




                                                          
37
 Long term debt ($1.247 million) + Current Portion of Long-Term debt ($40 million) – cash & cash equivalents 
($198 million) 
38
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4.2.3 Adjusted Present Value  
Dresser-Rand has had an unstable capital structure in the past (Appendix 18). Between 
2006 and 2010 the Total Debt / Total Capital Ratio fluctuated between 25% and 54%. 
Therefore, the DCF approach does not deliver the most accurate results and the APV 
model can be used to adjust for changing capital structures.  After applying the 
unlevered cost of equity of 11.67% as the discount rate for the FCFFs and the cost of 
debt of 6.5% for ITS (Appendix 19), Dresser-Rand is worth $4.428 million or $58 a share. 
Interest Tax Shields are discounted differently compared to FCFFs since the risk of the 
FCFF and the ITS is different. ITS cash flows can be considered as uncertain as interest 
and principal payments and therefore the cost of debt is more suitable. 
Table 22: Dresser-Rand Adjusted-Present-Value  
 
* Discount factor FCFFs: Unlevered cost of equity = 11.67% [risk free rate (2.34 %) + unlevered beta  
(1.29) x (market premium 7.25%)] 
** Discount factor ITS: Cost of debt = 6.5% 
Year 
Free cash flow ($ 
million)
Interest tax shield 
($ million)
Present value of 
FCFF ($ million)*
Present value of 
ITS ($ million)**
2014 514 23 461 21 
2015 311 26 249 23 
2016 329 29 236 24 
2017 349 33 224 26 
2018 370 38 213 28 
2019 392 43 202 30 
2020 417 49 192 32 
2021 443 56 183 34 
Continuing value 5.679 1.638 2.349 990 
Present Value 4.310 1.207 
Presnet value of FCFF in $ million 4.310 
Present value of interest tax shields in $ million 1.207 
Present value of FCFF and interest tax shieldsin $ million 5.517 
Less: Value of debt in $ million 1.089 
Equity Value in $ million 4.428 
Equity Value per share in $ 57,66
Δ current Share Price -16%
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4.2.4 Multiples 
According to the analogical valuation method, more precisely market multiples, Dresser-
Rand can be valued between $37 and $60 a share. As this valuation range is below the 
current market price, the shares of Dresser-Rand appear to be overvalued.  
 
Table 23: Dresser-Rand Analogical Valuation Method – Market Multiples 
 
Figures in $ million except for price per share 
Peer-Group Dresser-Rand (Appendix 20) 
Besides market multiples, the value for Dresser-Rand can also be obtained from similar 
market transactions (Appendix 21). Deriving the value of Dresser-Rand from other 
similar transactions results in higher valuations than in the caso of market multiples. 
The valuation range from $66 to $88 is relatively high and reveals, that similar 
transactions were priced at a relatively high level. 
Table 24: Dresser-Rand Analogical Valuation Method – Transaction Multiples  
 
Figures in $ million except for price per share 
 
4.2.5 Alternative Valuation 
The Houston-based firm is correlated to WTI-prices as mentioned earlier. To find out the 
relationship between the value of the firm and the level of oil prices, I ran a linear 
regression with WTI-Oil prices as the independent variable (x) and PE / Ratios of the 
Sub Index Peer Group “S&P Oil&Gas Equipment and Services Select Industry Index” as 
the dependent variable (y). The outcome of this regression is that the P/E ratio of this 







Equity Value Price per 
share in $
Δ Current Price 
per share*
EV/Sales 1,76 x Sales 2014e: 3.254 5.720 1.089 4.631 60,30 -12%
EV/EBITDA 7,03 x EBITDA 2014e: 550 3.866 1.089 2.777 36,16 -47%
EV/EBIT 9,99 x EBIT 2014e: 456 4.549 1.089 3.460 45,06 -34%
Price Earnings Ratio 14,33 x Earnings 2014e: 200 2.867 37,33 -45%





TV/Sales 2,41 x Sales 2014e: 3.254 87,94 29%
TV/EBITDA 11,12 x EBITDA 2014e: 550 65,50 -4%
TV/EBIT 13,68 x EBIT 2014e: 456 66,97 -2%
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Oil Price WTI in $
Sub-Index is dependend on the WTI price level. Given the assumption that the Sub-Index 
is a reasonable proxy for Dresser-Rand, the Houston based firm can be approximated on 
the basis of WTI prices.  The current WTI price of $96 delivers an equity value of $64 per 
share.   
 
Chart 12: Dresser-Rand alternative valuation – oil price regression 
 
 
4.2.6 Valuation Summary  
In conclusion, the various valuation techniques deliver relatively different results. A 
possible valuation range for Dresser-Rand can be defined from $36 to $88 a share. 
However, as most of the valuation techniques, in particular market multiples, DCF and 
APV result in relatively low valuations, Dresser-Rand tends to be to be overvalued.   The 
huge valuation spread reveals high uncertainty in terms of valuing the company.  
Interestingly, the Oil-Price regression and EBIT and EBITDA Transaction multiples 
deliver close valuations to the current market price. This might explain that Dresser-
Rand is currently valued more on the basis of oil-prices and current market trends, than 
on intrinsic values. Furthermore, transaction multiples result in higher valuations than 
market multiples, which reveal that companies such as Dresser-Rand are attractive 
targets for which acquirers accept high premiums at the moment.    
Valuation 
Price Oil 29/08/2014 95,96
Multiple 24,50
Net Income 200 
Equity Value 4909
Equity Value per share 64,00$               
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4.3 Synergy Valuation 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In M&A, the identification and quantification of synergies is absolutely crucial and 
mainly determines whether or not a deal is beneficial. The quantification of synergies 
makes the evaluation of a transaction difficult and sometimes even nebulous, due to the 
numerous assumptions and forecasts. Damodaran (2005) claims that synergies are 
“often promised and seldom delivered”. Devine (2002) goes even further and describes 
synergies as “mysterious elements” which are the “driving forces for M&A”. 
In order to calculate a reasonable bid price for Dresser-Rand, this case study focuses on 
reliable core synergies which have higher tendencies to create value and to be realized 
than dubious and vague synergies. A potential acquisition of Dresser-Rand by Siemens 
uncovers the following core synergies: 
 
APV 58 DCF 48
EV/EBITDA 36
EV/EBIT 45
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(€ million) 2014 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e
Sales Power & Gas without Dresser 12.720 13.483 14.292 15.150 16.059 17.022 18.044 19.126
Operating synergy impact - additional growth +0,6% 0 +80,90 +85,75 +90,90 +96,35 +102,13 +108,26 +114,76
Impact (Δ)
EBIT 0 +7,36 +7,80 +8,27 +8,77 +9,29 +9,85 +10,44
Tax on EBIT 0 +1,99 +2,11 +2,23 +2,37 +2,51 +2,66 +2,82
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) 0 +5,37 +5,70 +6,04 +6,40 +6,78 +7,19 +7,62
1. Synergies from revenue enhancements, resulting from new market access and 
additional customers.   
2. Cost synergies  
i. Reduced Research & Development Costs.  
ii. Reduced Selling, General & Administrative Expenses. 
The synergy quantification requires a business breakdown for Siemens to adequately 
analyze where in detail synergies come into play. Acquiring Dresser-Rand almost 
exclusively affects Siemens Power & Gas sector.  
The following calculations are based on the assumption that Dresser-Rand will be 
acquired and will remain a separate entity. As it is an M&A transaction of unequal 
parties, the calculations focus on synergy effects on the acquirer Siemens.  
 
4.3.2 Operating Synergies  
4.3.2.1 Revenue enhancements  
Not only due to new market and customer access, but also due to the combination of 
different functional strengths, the acquisition of Dresser-Rand could enable additional 
revenue for Siemens. The revenue synergy valuation is based on the major assumption 
that a deal affects and coins Siemens’ Power & Gas business. An acquisition of Dresser-
Rand could allow Siemens to adopt Dresser-Rand’s long-term growth rate of 6.6%39 for 
its total Power & Gas business unit, which has a current long-term growth rate of 6%40. 
Given this assumption, 0.6% of additional sales create additional deal synergy value of 
€116 million. The synergy potential can be justified by additional customers (geographic 
expansion) and additional services and new equipment (vertical & functional expansion). 
Table 25: Impact of operating Synergies – additional revenue on Siemens’ FCFF 
                                                          
39
 According to Dresser-Rand’s Management  
40
 www.siemens.com/investor - January 2015 
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Impact on Siemens Valuation Sceanario 
NPV FCFF in € 
million 
Equity Value 







NPV with synergy impact in € million 97.801 +0,3% growth 97.743 97,72 0,07 58
Net Financial Debt in  € million 11656 +0,6% growth 97.801 97,78 0,13 116
 Equity Value with synergy impact 
per share in € 
97,78
+0,9% growth 97.860 97,85 0,20 175
Δ synergy per share in € 0,13 +1,2% growth 97.918 97,91 0,26 233





4.3.2.2 Reduced Costs  
4.3.2.2.1 Research & Development costs 
Apart from revenue synergies, a Dresser-Rand deal could create cost synergies, resulting 
in higher EBITs and therefore higher Free-Cash-Flows-to-the-Firm. After a potential 
transaction, Research & Development (R&D) expenses by Dresser-Rand are no longer 
necessary to be also allocated from Siemens. Otherwise, these costs would have been 
paid twice. Based on the assumption that the nature of both firms’ R&D expenses is 
similar, I considered Dresser-Rand’s R&D expenses the reduction for Siemens’ cost base 
and therefore the additional value. For Dresser-Rand’s R&D expense forecast, I applied 
the three year average of 1.2% as a % of Sales ratio. Following these assumption, R&D 
cost synergies are worth €49 million.  
Table 26: Impact of operating Synergies – reduced R&D costs  
 
 
* R&D expenses need to be translated into EURO (at 1.3128 – September 1, 2014) as the impact on Siemens’ FCFF is measured  
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
R&D as a % of Sales 1,19% 1,19% 1,19% 1,19% 1,19% 1,19% 1,19%
Sales in $ 3492 3746 4020 4313 4628 4966 5329
R&D expenses in $ 42 45 48 51 55 59 63
R&D expenses in €* 32 34 36 39 42 45 48
Impact (Δ) for Siemens 
EBIT +2,88 +3,09 +3,32 +3,56 +3,82 +4,10 +4,40
Tax on EBIT +0,78 +0,83 +0,90 +0,96 +1,03 +1,11 +1,19
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) +2,10 +2,26 +2,42 +2,60 +2,79 +2,99 +3,21
Impact on Siemens Valuation Sceanario 
NPV FCFF in € 
million 
Equity Value 







NPV with synergy impact in € million 97.733 -50% 97.709 97,68 0,03 24
Net Financial Debt in  € million 11656 -25% 97.722 97,69 0,04 37
 Equity Value with synergy impact per 
share in € 
97,70 base scenario 1,19% 97.733 97,70 0,06 49
Δ synergy per share in € 0,06 +25% 97.746 97,72 0,07 61
value of synergy in € million 49 +50% 97.758 97,73 0,08 73
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4.3.2.2.2 Selling, General  & Administrative costs  
Another operating synergy comes from reducing Selling, General & Administrative 
(SG&A) expenses. This particular synergy of increasing profitability by reducing costs is 
relatively likely to be implemented. I assumed the Power & Gas business of Siemens is 
able to reduce its SG&A expenses due to economies of skill, scale and scope by around 50 
basis points. Forecasts for SG&A expenses are made on the basis of Siemens Power & 
Gas three year SG&A as a %-of Sales ratio average of 7.43%. These economies of skill & 
scale create additional synergies of €97 million. 
Table 27: Impact of operating synergies – reduced SG&A costs 
 
 
* SG&A expenses are expected to remain their 3-year-average-sales ratio of 7.43%  
 
4.3.3 Other Synergies  
Financial Synergies 
Apart from operating synergies a potential acquisition might also uncover financial 
synergies. Even though Dresser-Rand will remain a separate entity afterwards and even 
though the firm will be listed separately in America, the company could take advantage 
of Siemens’ beneficial access to debt. Dresser-Rand’s future cost of issuing debt might 
decrease. This phenomenon was first described and defined as the coinsurance effect by 
Lewellen (1971). Due to its speculative and vague character, a thorough quantification 
(€ million) 2015e 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Sales Power & Gas 13.483 14.292 15.150 16.059 17.022 18.044 19.126
SG&A expenses* 1.002 1.062 1.126 1.194 1.265 1.341 1.422
SG&A expenses - 50bps 67 71 76 80 85 90 96
SG&A expenses after synergie impact 935 991 1.050 1.113 1.180 1.251 1.326
Impact (Δ) for Siemens 
EBIT +6,13 +6,50 +6,89 +7,31 +7,75 +8,21 +8,70
Tax on EBIT +1,66 +1,76 +1,86 +1,97 +2,09 +2,22 +2,35
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) +4,48 +4,75 +5,03 +5,33 +5,65 +5,99 +6,35
Impact on Siemens Valuation Sceanario 
NPV FCFF in € 
million 
Equity Value 







NPV with synergy impact in € million 97.782 -10bps 97.704 97,67 0,02 19
Net Financial Debt in  € million 11656 -25bps 97.733 97,70 0,06 49
 Equity Value with synergy impact per 
share in € 
97,76 -50bps 97.782 97,76 0,11 97
Δ synergy per share in € 0,11 75bps 97.830 97,81 0,17 146
value of synergy in € million 97 100bps 97.879 97,87 0,22 194
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of this type of synergy is not possible. Nevertheless it should be taken into consideration 
when valuation the acquisition price of Dresser-Rand.  
Synergies from Cash-Slack 
Synergies from Cash-Slack are also conceivable: Siemens’ advantageous financial 
position, in particular the cheap access to capital markets and the high level of cash 
might help Dresser-Rand to implement additional projects the company might have 
rejected without Siemens’ acquisition. The Houston-based company together with three 
other firms for instance announced an $8 billion project which would link a wind farm in 
Wyoming with one of the biggest energy storage facilities. The project has huge potential 
to bring large amounts of clean energy to Los Angeles. Nevertheless, it was not possible 
to estimate an NPV for the project and consequently a reliably quantified synergy value. 
Furthermore, I could not clarify whether or not Dresser-Rand would have undertaken 
the project without a merger with Siemens. A quantification is too speculative. 
Nevertheless, this kind of synergy is likely to occur and influence the bid price for 
Dresser-Rand.   
 
4.3.4 Implementation & Transaction costs  
M&A deals are expensive, both in terms of transaction and more importantly in 
implementation costs. For this case study, I considered transaction fees of 75bps of the 
deal value. Implementation costs are more difficult to quantify because of the lack of 
predictability.  Problems may occur in the future which might have not been anticipated 
beforehand. Nevertheless, $150 million can be recognized as a realistic expense for a 
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Table 28: Transaction Costs  
 
* Total Deal Value: Standalone value Dresser-Rand (DCF) ($3.650/€2.780) + synergy base case sales (€116/$153) + synergy base 
case R&D (€49/$64) + synergy base case SG&A (€97/$127) = $3.994/€3.043 
exchange ratio EUR/USD: 1,3128 (as of  1/29/2014)  
 
4.3.5 Synergy Summary  
Due to the fact, that synergy valuations can be biased and sometimes even nebulous, 
different scenario calculations are useful.  For each type of synergy, this case study 
considers a pessimistic, base and optimistic scenario. The respective assumptions can be 
obtained from Table 29.   
Table 29: Total Synergy values – scenario comparison  
 
* Siemens Power & Gas sales +0,3% - R&D expenses 20% lower than base case of 1.2% of Sales from Dresser-Rand – 
SG&A 25bps reduction from average of 7.43% of Siemens Power & Gas sales – Transaction fees: 1% of the total deal 
value and implementation costs €200 million over the next 3 years. 
** Siemens Power & Gas sales +0,6% - R&D expenses equal 1.2% (3 year average) of Sales from Dresser Rand – SG&A 
50bps reduction from average 7.34% of Siemens Power & Gas sales - Transaction fees: 0.75% of the total deal value 
and implementation costs €150 million over the next 3 years 
*** Siemens Power & Gas sales + 0.9% - R&D expenses 20% higher than  base case of 1.2% of Sales from Dresser-Rand 
– SG&A 75bps reduction from average 7.43%  of Siemens Power & Gas sales - Transaction fees: 0.5% of the total deal 
value and implementation costs €100 million over the next 3 years 
Acquisition Costs in € million 2015 2016 2017
Fees – 1% of the total deal volume* 23
Implementation Costs 60 50 40
Total Acquisition Costs 83 50 40
NPV of Costs 78 44 33
Sum of NPVs in € 155
€ $ € $ € $
Operating Synergy 
Increasing Revenue 58 76 116 153 175 229
Decreasing Costs 
R&D 37 48 49 64 61 80
SG&A 49 64 97 127 146 191
Total Synergy Value 143 188 262 344 452 593
Total Transaction Costs 207 271 155 203 103 135
Total Synergie Value - Total Costs -63 -83 107 141 349 458
Base **Pessimistic* Optimistic ***
Type of Synergy 
MASTER THESIS | MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS | SIEMENS – DRESSER-RAND | ANDREAS SCHARF | 2015 
- 52 - 
 
In conclusion, the synergy value, which comes along with the acquisition of Dresser-
Rand, can be quantified between $141 and $458 million or €1.8 and $6 a share. The base 
case can be considered the most realistic and valid estimation.  
5. Conclusion  
5.1 Real offer versus theoretical price    
Having valued Dresser-Rand as a stand-alone firm and having added potential synergy 
values, leads to the conclusion, that the real bid price of $83 a share is fairly high. Even 
when considering the most optimistic synergy view, the final offer price by Siemens 
significantly exceeds this valuation by $10 a share. (Chart 13) 
Chart 13: Dresser-Rand offer price – scenario comparison in $ 
   
* Dresser-Rand’s valuation can be summarized to $45 – $67 a share by adjusting for “outliers” (EV/EBITDA, P/E and TV/Sales)  
There are multiple reasons for the difference between the offer price of this case study 
and the real offer price:  
First, it could be possible that Siemens’ target valuation, as well as potential synergy 
valuations might be over optimistic.  
Besides that, external and internal valuations may differ due to the access to information. 










Dresser-Rand Valuation Range* Synergy value
              Siemens takeover bids   $66      $73            $83 
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taken into account additional synergies from other acquisitions, which are not yet 
completed and publicly known. In particular, a potential acquisition of the gas turbine 
and compressor business of Rolls Royce could create additional synergies when 
acquiring Dresser-Rand. The two companies could complete each other.   
Furthermore, Siemens might pay this premium because of strategic potential which can 
barely be quantified and valued by an external party. Although, literature condemns 
M&A which are undertaken for strategic reasons, it might affect Siemens’ offer price.   
Another reason for paying more is the fact that Siemens tries to take over Dresser-Rand 
in a friendly takeover. Current target shareholders require a premium to be 
compensated for the transaction risk and the post-transaction changes. Siemens could 
pay for control in this case without facing shareholder barriers. 
It might also be possible that Siemens faces pressure to close a deal after missing the 
acquisition of Alstom. This pressure may force management to pay much more than the 
target is worth. The fact that similar transactions were also priced at a high level might 
have supported Siemens’ plan to pay such a high premium.  
Furthermore, a higher premium could be paid due to a personal bidding competition 
between Joe Kaeser (Siemens CEO) and Peter Löscher (Sulzer, Chairman of the Board of 
Directors and former CEO of Siemens).41 Although, personal interests and power 
demonstrations should not influence professional business decisions, one might assume 
that this factor did influence the bidding price in this case. 
The fact that Siemens changed its offer price from $66 to $83 could reveal that non-
financial reasons overwhelm initial financial calculations. Chart 13 reveals that the 
second bid of $73 was the maximum price Siemens should have offered. 
5.2 Implementation Risks 
The Siemens and Dresser-Rand deal creates the following core implementation and 
post-acquisition risks:  
                                                          
41
 Löscher was CEO of Siemens from 2007 -2013. Kaeser was his CFO. At Sulzer, Löscher was involved in the 
bidding process for Dresser-Rand 
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1. Regulatory and legislative risks: The European Commission claimed that the merged 
company would compete only with General Electric in turbo compressors and drivers 
for trains (Reuters 2015). Moreover, the EU’s antitrust unit had concerns that the 
transaction may reduce competition in the market for small steam turbines (Norman 
2015). Consequently, it is likely that the deal completion date could be postponed and 
certain assets or sub-divisions need to be sold to fulfill regulatory requirements.  
 
2. Overall economic and M&A market sentiment risk: The current economic 
environment is favorable to complete the deal and the economic uncertainty can be 
considered relatively low. Nevertheless, the political problems in Europe, namely in 
Russia and Greece, may change the positive market sentiment in the near future and 
should be taken into consideration.  
 
3. Improper target identification and valuation: It goes without saying that the business 
of Dresser-Rand fits into Siemens’ Energy division from a strategic point of view. 
However, as the valuation part revealed, Siemens offer price of $83 a share is too high 
and may create significant post transaction risks. Siemens might face criticism from 
shareholders, government, employees, customers or other stakeholders if the high 
price is not justified by additional future cash flows.  
 
4. Currency and Oil-price risk: The strong Euro against Dollar42 might depreciate in the 
following months43 – in particular with respect to a potential interest rate hike in the 
US. As a result the transaction value for Siemens in Euro increases. A similar effect 
can be obtained from decreasing oil-prices. As Dresser-Rand’s business is related to 
WTI, a further price decrease could lower the value of the target.  Since market prices 
are mostly hedged, one can assume that Siemens is not strongly affected by market 
movements. Nevertheless, the price for hedging should be taken into consideration 
and influences the overall transaction value.  
 
5. Control risk: The control risk is relatively low, as Siemens offered a high premium to 
Dresser-Rand’s shareholders and thereby minimizes the risk for potential control 
                                                          
42
 EUR/USD – 1.3128 as of September 1, 2014 
43
 Goldman Sachs expects EUR/USD parity by the end of 2017 – as of September 18, 2014 – (Ro 2015) 
MASTER THESIS | MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS | SIEMENS – DRESSER-RAND | ANDREAS SCHARF | 2015 
- 55 - 
 
problems. In addition to that, Dresser-Rand’s management already recommended 
accepting Siemens offer. 
 
6. Walk-away risk: The walk away risk is at a low level with termination fees for 
Dresser-Rand of $200 million and $400 million for Siemens. In relation to the size of 
the company, Dresser-Rand’s termination fees set stronger incentives not to walk 
away from the deal than Siemens’ $400 million.  
 
7. Siemens’ Shareholder Value at Risk (SVAR) of 1.05% is relatively small due to the 
mismatch in market values between acquirer and seller. Despite the fact that Siemens 
offers a price which is 21% above the current market value, the risk for its 
shareholders if synergies are not realized is limited. In total, €856 million of Siemens 
€84.205 million are at risk.  
Table 30: Shareholder Value at Risk   
 
* EUR/USD exchange rate as of 01.09.2014 – 1,3128 USD  
* Market Values as of 01.09.2014 
 
 
In conclusion, transaction risks can be considered relatively low, except for regulatory 
and legislative issues. As the size of target and acquirer is different, the implementation 
of Dresser-Rand is easier than in the case of merger of equals. Moreover, Siemens with 
its frequent acquisitions has the necessary know-how and experience to minimize post-
transaction risks.  
 
 
Offer Price in $ 83,00
Current Share Price in $ 68,36
Premium Paid % 21%
Total Premium Paid in $ 1.124
Market Value Buyer € 93 84.205 
Market Value Buyer $ 110.544 
Market Value Seller $ 68 5.263 
Market Value Seller € 4.009 
SVAR 1,02%
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5.3 Summary 
From a strategic point of view the acquisition of Dresser-Rand has potential to 
significantly add value to Siemens’ energy division. Dresser-Rand’s comprehensive 
portfolio of compressors, steam turbines, gas turbines and engines could complement 
Siemens’ Oil & Gas business and could help the company to position for future energy 
business changes. In particular, the participation in the business of hydraulic fracturing, 
which is yet concentrated in the United States, is indispensable in the future. In addition 
to that, the efficient Aftermarket Parts and Services division could help Siemens to 
increase its profitability and generate additional revenues.  Furthermore, after the 
unsuccessful bid for Alstom, an acquisition of Dresser-Rand would increase the 
competitive edge against competitors. The target could complete Siemens’ Oil & Gas 
portfolio and could fit to a potential acquisition of Rolls-Royce‘s Energy aero-derivative 
gas turbine and compressor business.    
To judge, whether or not Siemens’ offer of $83 a share is a reasonable and fair price is 
complex, since a third person often has less transparency in synergy calculations and 
other internal information. Evaluating synergies and therefore economic reasoning in 
M&A is still relatively subjective and sometimes even vague. Nevertheless, after having 
valued Dresser-Rand independently and having valued potential synergies, the price of 
$83 appears fairly high. Taken into consideration the assumption that Dresser-Rand’s 
pre-acquisition price is overvalued and potential synergies range from $141 to $458 
million, leads to the conclusion that $83 is inaccurate and does not reflect the true value 
of a potential acquisition.  Interestingly, synergy valuations can justify a relatively high 
premium for Dresser-Rand. Nonetheless, the current valuation of $68 appears to be too 
high to pay a premium of 21%. The facts that Siemens increased its initial offer by 25%, 
Dresser-Rand’s Board of Directors unanimously recommended the shareholders to 
accept the offer and the termination fee of $400 for Siemens support these findings. An 
acquisition price of $47 to $73 appears to be more justifiable. 
This case study has shown that the world of M&A is fascinating, but also complex. Bid-
prices and current market values often substantially diverge – depending on the 
strategic fit and potential synergies. The main drivers for Siemens’ generous $7.6 billion 
offer can be found in: 
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1. Capital Markets and Shareholder pressure to realize additional growth and 
revenue. 
2. Unsuccessful recent acquisition activities – Losing the bidding competition for 
Alstom to the main competitor General Electric could have affected Siemens’ 
choice to place a high bid offer price for Dresser-Rand.    
3. Legal domestic burden – The method of hydraulic fracturing is considered the 
most effective and profitable oil & gas exploration technique. The United States 
offers a more liberal legal environment to take advantage of these techniques 
than other countries – in particular Germany.  
4. Technological burden – The current shift in the energy business from 
conventional to renewable energy solutions requires frequent technological 
evolution. To keep track with standards, Siemens might undertake the 
acquisition in order to import external knowledge and know how.  
5. High amount of cash – The current low interest rate levels and therefore the 
cheap refinancing created significant cash reserves for many companies. The 
beneficial situation of excess cash drives the appetite for inorganic growth and 
high offer prices can be observed more frequently. After receiving €3.250 for the 
B/S/H/ stake, Siemens has excess cash to invest. 
6. Personal interest – Although personal interests should not drive M&A activities, 
Siemens’’ CEO Joe Kaeser might have been influenced by the fact, that his former 
boss, Peter Löscher who is now CEO of Siemens’ competitor Sulzer, was also 
involved in the bidding competition.  
The last driver uncovers the question of how much power a CEO should have in M&A 
transactions. A CEO should act on behalf of the shareholder, working closely with the 
Board of Management and especially closely with the CFO. A transaction should be solely 
based on numbers and not on strategic, unquantifiable reasons. Furthermore, as 
Cullinan, Le Roux & M. Weddigen (2004) suggest, the acquirer should define a strict 
walk away price which avoids paying too much for an acquisition. This deal, with its 
continuing bidding revises, appears to have a less strict walk away strategy. 
MASTER THESIS | MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS | SIEMENS – DRESSER-RAND | ANDREAS SCHARF | 2015 











Analogical approach Patrimonial approach 
 
“The company is worth, 
what it will generate” 
“The company is 
worth, what others 
buy/sell it for” 
“The company is 
worth what other 
companies are 
worth” 
“The company is worth what it 
owns” 
 Based on future Based on present Based on present Based on past 






Share price P%L / Balance Sheet Balance Sheet 
Valuation 
Method 
Discounted Cash Flows Share price 
Trading multiples / 
M&A multiples 
Restated Net Worth / “Sum of 
the parts” 
     
Source: Adapted from C. Nijdam, Alpha Value (www.alphavalue.net
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Source: Roberts, Wallace and Moles (2010
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Premium all deals Premium Cross Border Deals
Average Premium All Deals Average Premium Cross Border
Appendix 3: Cross-border M&A premium  
 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
 
 
Appendix 4: Managing Mergers  
 
M&A deals are more likely to fail when firms enter an unprofitable industry, refuse to 
exit from one or step into a market they have rare competencies in. Furthermore, deals 
have a lower chance to be successful in case economic benefits are improbable or the 
acquirer fails to seek some economic advantage. In addition to that, the way of deal 
structuring also significantly decides the outcome of a merger [Bruner (2004)]. Eccles, 
Lanes & Wilson (1999) suggest not allowing the negotiating manager to price the deal to 
avoid subjective, biased merger management.  
Moreover, Cullinan, Le Roux & Weddigen (2004) lay stress on a proper due diligence. 
The acquirer should also be aware of what in detail they are buying, what the target´s 
stand-alone value is, what synergies could be realistically implemented and most 
importantly what the walk away price is.  
Sirower & Sahni (2006) developed an earnings-based model to help in the process of 
managing mergers and to avoid the synergy trap. They invented a Meet the Premium 
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Plausible but insufficient synergies 
Not plausible and Insufficient synergies 



















Insufficient synergy mix  
Insufficient synergy mix  
Sufficient mix of cost and revenue synergies  
Line (MTP) to figure out whether or not a synergy mix is sufficient.  In addition to that, a 
plausibility box and a feasibility check help to assess whether or not the synergy mix is 
plausible and feasible.  
 
1. Set up a Meet the Premium (MTP) Line to figure out whether or not a synergy mix is 
sufficient or not.  The MTP combines management´s revenue- and cost synergy 
expectations and is defined as:  
       
 
   
            
 
The Meet the Premium Line (MTP Line) Plausibility Box  
Cost Synergies (%SynC) are determined by the premium offered (%P), the pre-tax 
profit margin which equals EBIT in the model (π) and the expected percentage 
revenue synergies (%SynR). Higher premiums paid require higher cost and revenue 
synergies. Only if a synergy mix is above the line, the deal should be realized.  
 
2. Analyze synergies through a Plausibility Box: 
To apply the concept of the MTP line, it is also important to look whether a synergy 
mix is plausible or not. Even though a mix is above the line, the deal is not necessarily 
profitable. If the expected synergies are not plausible and the mix consequently lies 
outside the plausibility box the deal should not be realized.   
  
3. Feasibility check – sources of synergies  
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Expedition Expansion Enhancement Efficiency 
For the acquirer it is not always trivial to classify the kind of synergy and therefore 
the MTP line and the plausibility check is difficult to apply. To avoid this drawback 
Sirower & Sahni (2006) suggest a capabilities/market access matrix which helps to 
classify synergies. New capabilities in new markets usually create revenue synergies 








Source: (Sirower & Sahni 2006) 
 
In addition to that, Sirower & Sahni (2006) defined the Shareholder Value at Risk 
(SVAR) as a useful tool to assess the relative magnitude of synergy risk.  The SVAR 
shows how much of a company is at risk if no post-acquisition synergies are realized. 
The authors describe the ratio as a “bet your company index” and define it as:  
   
 
The greater the premium percentage paid to sellers and the greater their market value 
relative to the acquiring company, the higher the SVAR. The main drawback of the 
method is that in cases in which acquirers lose more than their premium, SVARs 
underestimate risks.  
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Today’s management should take advantage of the extensive skill set of anti-takeover 
strategies to remain autonomous and to be able to react to hostile takeovers. In times of 
dynamic M&A markets, take-over protection and shareholder structure management is 
absolutely crucial. Literature divides takeover defense into preventive and active. Active 
strategies are applied once a takeover is publicly known. A thorough strategy however 
should include management actions beforehand (Appendix 5). 
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Appendix 5: Takeover defense strategies  
 
Defense Strategy (Preventive/Active) Description 
Poison pill (P) Rights which allow holders to purchase share at a discount. Cost of potential takeover becomes  expensive. 
People pill (P) 
When takeover happens, recent management of the target firm resigns at the same time.  Success of this 
strategy depends on the situation: If managers are skillful and the bidder wants to keep them it is 
counterproductive. In the normal case, where the bidder wants to change management and restructure the 
target it is a highly efficient preventive takeover strategy. 
Poison put (P) Gives the bondholder the right to be redeemed at par before maturity. 
Staggered board (P) 
Limited number of board directors can be elected at one time, difficulties for bidder to get significant control. 
New controlling shareholders have to wait before winning total control. 
Supermajority Provisions (P) Special rule where a simple board majority is not sufficient to make decisions. 
Dual capitalizations – different classes of 
stock (P) 
Different voting rights and dividend entitlements: intention to distribute shares with voting rights in the hands 
of shareholder who are more loyal to the firm and less likely to accept an offer from a hostile bidder 
Move to a state with stronger antitakeover 
laws (P) 
 
Golden Parachute (P) Lucrative benefits to the top executives in case the company is not taken over. 
Macaroni Defense (P) Issue a large number of bonds which will be redeemed at a higher price if the company is taken over. 
Antitrust lawsuit (A) 
Even though the lawsuit is expected not to be successful it provides time to implement other defense 
strategies. 
Greenmail / Goodbye  Kiss (A) 
Payment to the bidder of a sufficient amount so that it retreats and stops with the takeover plans. Popular in 
the 1980s – Today, relatively unpopular defense strategy.  
White knight (A&P) Selling shares to a more friendly party. 
Restructure the company (A&P) Making the firm less attractive through asset sales and/or purchases.  
Leveraged Recapitalization / Capital 
structure change (A&P) 
Amount of debt that can be raised by a bidder to finance the transaction becomes lower - results in difficulties 
for the bidder in financing the takeover. Limited strategy, highly depends on the optimal level of debt.   
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Revenue Operating Income Margin







Type I: Cash Cows 
Revenue: +++ 
Operating Income: +++  
Type III: Poor Dogs   
Operating Income: <= 0 
Type II: Potentials 
Revenue: + to ++ 
Operating Income: +  
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XS0247659542 USD 16.03.2016 500 381 107,32 5,63% 0,708 0,02%
XS0264823567 USD 17.10.2016 1750 1333 109,42 5,75% 1,16 0,10%
XS0413806596 EUR 20.02.2017 2000 2000 111,61 5,13% 0,379 0,05%
DE000A1G0WB9 USD 16.08.2017 1500 1143 112,38 1,05% -2,938 0%*
DE000A1HGXL7 USD 12.03.2018 500 381 99,92 1,50% 1,458 0,04%
XS0369461644 EUR 11.06.2018 1600 1600 118,90 5,63% 0,542 0,06%
DE000A1G0WD5 USD 16.08.2019 1500 1143 116,80 1,65% -1,598 0%*
DE000A1G85B4 EUR 10.03.2020 1000 1000 104,37 1,50% 0,69 0,04%
DE000A1UDWM7 EUR 12.03.2021 1250 1250 106,00 1,75% 0,801 0,06%
DE000A1G85C2 GBP 10.09.2025 350 443 95,40 2,75% 3,253 0,09%
XS0264824375 USD 17.08.2026 1750 1333 6,13% 3,524 0,30%
DE000A1UDWN5 EUR 10.03.2028 1000 1000 112,89 2,88% 1,792 0,11%
DE000A1G85D0 GBP 10.09.2042 650 822 98,71 3,75% 3,826 0,20%
XS0266838746 EUR 14.09.2066 900 900 108,25 5,25% 2,224 0,13%











2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2025 2026 2028 2042 2066
EUR GBP USD
Appendix 7: Siemens Cost of Debt  
 
 
* Currency spots rate as of 09/01/2015: EUR/USD 1,3128   |   GBP/EUR 1,265 
* To avoid bias, negative Yield to Maturities were converted to zero  
 
 
Debt Redemption Profile in domestic currency in million 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Supply / Demand mismatch Oil Supply / Demand mismatch Natural Gas Supply Oil
Demand Oil Supply Natural Gas Demand Natural Gas
Appendix 8: Oil & Gas - Demand and Supply  
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Power of Suppliers is low … 
• Raw Material suppliers (Steel, aluminium, iron etc) 
 Low level of Specialisation 
 Low market concentration  
 Low switching costs (Price competitive) 
    
Threat of Substitutes is managable …  
• Highly specialized products and services 
(related to products) within Oil&Gas Industry 
– low threat of subsitutes 
• High number of possible energy substitues 
outside the Oil&Gas industry: alternative 
fuels (coal, solar power, wind power, 
hydroelectricity and nuclear energy) – high 
threat of substitutes  
 
Power of Buyers is relatively low… 
• Size of Orders is small – highly specialized 
products  
• High product differentiation 
• High switching costs for Buyers 
• Buyers have only few alternative energy 
equipment solutions  
• Buyer price sensitivity relatively low 
Threat of new Entrants is low …    
• High entry barriers 
 High capital and technological requirements  
 Need for highly specialized workers & Industry 
Know How 
 Economies of scale available for existing firms 
 Strict and long-term refinery extration service 
rights and contracts 
 Regulatory and legal restrictions (Product 








Competitive Rivalry relatively low 
• Low competitiveness due to high buyers‘ 
switching costs, high product differentiation and 
limited number of eqal competitors 
• High competitiveness due to high exit barriers 
and high fixed costs  
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in €million 2013 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Current Assets 
Cash and Cash equivalents 9190 11.737 12.136 12.549 12.976 13.417 13.873 14.345 14.832
as a % of sales 12% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Marketable securities 601 417 431 446 461 476 493 509 527
as a % of sales 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Receivables 14853 15.340 15.862 16.401 16.959 17.535 18.131 18.748 19.385
as a % of sales 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Inventory 15560 15.572 16.101 16.649 17.215 17.800 18.405 19.031 19.678
as a % of sales 21% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Deferred income taxes 794 790 817 845 874 904 934 966 999
as a % of sales 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Other current assets 5940 6.856 7.089 7.330 7.579 7.837 8.103 8.379 8.664
as a % of sales 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Total Current Assets 46938 50.712 52.436 54.219 56.063 57.969 59.940 61.978 64.085
Current Liabilities
Short-term debt 1944 2.592 2.680 2.771 2.865 2.963 3.063 3.168 3.275
as a % of sales 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Accounts payable 7599 8.002 8.274 8.556 8.846 9.147 9.458 9.780 10.112
as a % of sales 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Accrued liabilities 4485 4.901 5.068 5.240 5.419 5.603 5.793 5.990 6.194
as a % of sales 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Deferred income taxes 2151 2.092 2.163 2.236 2.312 2.391 2.472 2.556 2.643
as a % of sales 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Other current liabilities 21689 24.044 24.861 25.706 26.580 27.484 28.419 29.385 30.384
as a % of sales 29% 31% 31% 31% 31% 31% 31% 31% 31%
Total Current Liabilities 37868 41.631 43.046 44.510 46.023 47.588 49.206 50.879 52.608
Net Working Capital 9.070 9.082 9.390 9.710 10.040 10.381 10.734 11.099 11.476
Working Capital Requirements 12 309 319 330 341 353 365 377
Appendix 10: Siemens Working Capital Forecasts (2014 – 2021) 
 
 
Current Asset and Liability Items are expected to remain at their respective 5-year-%-of-sales ratio  
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Appendix 11: FCFF B/S/H/ 
 
 
Forecast Assumptions:  
 Sales will grow by the 3-year-CAGR of 4.3%  
 EBIT Margins remain at the 3-year-average of 6.2% 
 Tax as a % of EBIT equals 30% 
 PPE as a percentage of sales equals the ratio of 2013 - 16%  
 Depreciation as a percentage of PPE remains constant at 22% (ratio 2013) 
 Capital Expenditures = PPEt – PPEt-1 + depreciation
in € million 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e Perpetuity
Free Cash Flow Calculation
Sales 10.508 10.963 11.438 11.933 12.449 12.988 13.551 14.137 14.749 14.897 
Sales growth 7,2% 4,3% 4,3% 4,3% 4,3% 4,3% 4,3% 4,3% 4,3% 1%
EBIT 509 677 706 736 768 802 836 873 910 919 
EBIT margin 4,8% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2%
Tax 143 203 212 221 231 240 251 262 273 276 
Tax as a % of EBIT 28% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
NOPAT 366 474 494 516 538 561 585 611 637 644 
Depreciation 377 393 410 428 447 466 486 507 529 628 
Gross Cash flow 743 867 904 944 984 1.027 1.072 1.118 1.166 1.272 
Increase in Working Capital 325 -12 90 94 98 103 107 112 117 118 
Capex 377 467 487 508 530 553 577 602 628 628 
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) 41 412 327 341 356 371 388 404 422 526 
50 % stake of FCFF 164 171 178 186 194 202 211 263 
Siemens FCFF with B/S/H/ 4.707 4.867 5.032 5.203 5.380 5.563 5.752 6.271 
Siemens FCFF without 50% stake of B/S/H/ 4.543 4.696 4.854 5.018 5.186 5.361 5.541 6.008 
Cash received from sale 3.250 
Change in FCFF 3.086 -171 -178 -186 -194 -202 -211 -263 
Forecasts 




Total Debt to 
Equity Ratio Unlevered Beta
SUPERIOR ENERGY SERVICES INC 1,66 40% 1,29
WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL PL 0,89 117% 0,49
CAMERON INTERNATIONAL CORP 1,33 55% 0,96
BAKER HUGHES INC 1,53 25% 1,30
FMC TECHNOLOGIES INC 1,25 49% 0,92
HALLIBURTON CO 1,56 54% 1,13
NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO INC 1,92 15% 1,74
RPC INC 0,95 13% 0,87
TENARIS SA 1,09 8% 1,03
SCHLUMBERGER LTD 1,60 33% 1,30
DRIL-QUIP INC 1,43 0% 1,43
ION GEOPHYSICAL CORP 3,39 55% 2,45
OCEANEERING INTL INC 1,61 4% 1,57
OIL STATES INTERNATIONAL INC 1,98 15% 1,80
EXTERRAN HOLDINGS INC 1,68 95% 1,01
Ø Industry Unlevered Beta  1,29
Dresser-Rand levered beta 20% 1,47




Total Debt to 
Equity Ratio Unlevered Beta 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 1,22 207% 0,49
ALSTOM 1,35 112% 0,74
ABB LTD-REG 0,90 49% 0,67
TOSHIBA CORP 0,95 89% 0,58
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC SE 0,95 50% 0,69
MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC CORP 0,92 24% 0,79
LEGRAND SA 0,67 56% 0,48
EMERSON ELECTRIC CO 1,17 60% 0,81
HITACHI LTD 1,03 71% 0,68
MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES 0,78 55% 0,56
BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS 0,75 14% 0,68
DONGFANG ELECTRIC CORP LTD-A 0,65 42% 0,50
WARTSILA OYJ ABP 0,74 38% 0,58
SHANGHAI ELECTRIC GRP CO L-A 0,74 23% 0,63
AREVA 0,92 195% 0,38
Ø Industry Unlevered Beta  0,62
Siemens levered beta 18% 0,70
Siemens unlevered beta 18% 0,62
Levered Beta 
Levered Beta 

























To avoid bias, Siemens and Dresser-Rand are excluded from their respective Peer-Group 
Data source raw beta and capital ratios: Bloomberg as of September 1, 2014 
Levered Beta = Unlevered Beta * [1+ (1-t)*D/E] 
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SIEMENS AG-REG 18% Euro 84.655 99.987 78.454 10.215 7.139 11,75% 5.204
GENERAL ELECTRIC 56,30 USD 243.824 252.824 153.413 29.482 19.941 19,22% 17.641
ALSTOM 16,10 EUR 8.827 13.166 11.912 788 531 6,61% 730
ABB LTD-REG 17,14 CHF 39.790 41.243 40.011 5.957 4.661 14,89% 3.443
TOSHIBA 22,86 JPY 2.037.015 3.903.848 6.712.326 551.148 338.595 8,21% 150.746
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC 22,73 EUR 39.473 46.413 24.879 3.869 3.175 15,55% 2.502
MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC 11,95 JPY 2.971.727 3.061.433 4.279.776 460.338 293.066 10,76% 184.525
LEGRAND SA 22,21 EUR 11.403 12.269 4.707 1.080 932 22,94% 625
EMERSON ELECTRIC 28,55 USD 41.403 45.097 24.512 5.049 4.260 20,60% 2.858
HITACHI LTD 27,59 JPY 4.271.815 8.227.143 9.577.092 998.041 608.493 10,42% 273.660
MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES 21,89 JPY 2.207.378 3.327.530 4.015.188 422.031 273.550 10,51% 135.694
BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS 6,23 INR 618.386 545.114 336.373 32.007 36.141 9,52% 26.428
DONGFANG ELECTRIC 10,10 CNY 26.668 24.609 41.436 3.297 1.509 7,96% 2.166
WARTSILA OYJ ABP 13,62 EUR 7.546 7.921 4.739 695 581 14,67% 447
SHANGHAI ELECTRIC GRP 7,30 CNY 64.937 59.060 80.677 9.024 6.774 11,19% 2.485
AREVA 23,79 EUR 4.671 9.585 8.325 635 -28 7,63% -394
 Appendix 13: Siemens Interest Tax Shield Forecasts (2014 – 2021) 
 
Assumptions:  
    Nopat Growth 1% 
    Discount Rate ITS***: Cost of Debt: 1.37%  
    Tax-rate 27% 
    Net Debt: Increase at the 5-year CAGR of 4.41% 
 
* Future interest payments are calculated with the current cost of debt of 1.37% (Appendix 7) assuming 
the debt capital funding access remains at the current rate. 
** To determine the Continuing Value of interest tax shields beyond 2021, a growth perpetuity based on 
2021 interest tax shields, the cost of debt and the NOPAT growth rate is used.  
*** The cost of debt appropriately incorporates the riskiness of the ITS payments as they are as uncertain 
as interest and principal payments. 
 
 Appendix 14: Siemens Peer-Group  
 
Source: Bloomberg  












PV ITS (€ 
million)
2014e 11.263 1,37% 154 27% 42 41
2015e 11.759 1,37% 161 27% 43 42
2016e 12.277 1,37% 168 27% 45 44
2017e 12.818 1,37% 175 27% 47 45
2018e 13.383 1,37% 183 27% 49 46
2019e 13.972 1,37% 191 27% 52 48
2020e 14.588 1,37% 200 27% 54 49
2021e 15.231 1,37% 208 27% 56 50
Continuing Value** 15.441 13.850
14.215
Nopat growth: 1,00%
Cost of Debt: 1,37%
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($ million) 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e 2021e
Sales 3.033 3.254 3.492 3.746 4.020 4.313 4.628 4.966 5.329 
Capex 83 72 77 83 89 95 102 110 118 
Depreciation 92 95 97 100 103 106 110 113 117 
2013 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
2014e* 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4
2015e* 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6
2016e* 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8
2017e* 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0
2018e* 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2
2019e* 3,4 3,4 3,4
2020e* 3,7 3,7
2021e* 3,9
Total Depreciation 92 95 97 100 103 106 110 113 117 







Capital Expenditures are linearly depreciated taking into consideration an average life of fixed assets of 30 years 
 
Appendix 17: Dresser-Rand Working Capital Forecasts (2014 – 2021) 
 
 
Current Asset and Liability Items are expected to remain at their respective 5-year-%-of-sales ratio  
in $ million 
Current Assets 2013 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Cash and cash equivalents 171 268 287 308 331 355 381 409 439
as a % of sales 6% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Restricted cash 14 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 22
as a % of sales 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Accounts receivable 648 530 569 610 655 702 754 809 868
as a % of sales 21% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%
Inventories, net 653 572 614 659 707 759 814 874 937
as a % of sales 22% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%
Prepaid expenses and other 76 75 80 86 92 99 106 114 122
as a % of sales 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Deferred income taxes, net 29 47 50 54 58 62 67 71 77
as a % of sales 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Total Current Assets 1.591 1.505 1.615 1.733 1.860 1.995 2.141 2.297 2.465
Current Liabilities 2013 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Accounts payable and accruals 671 649 697 748 802 861 924 991 1.064
as a % of sales 22% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Customer advance payments 176 312 335 360 386 414 444 477 511
as a % of sales 6% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Accrued income taxes payable 35 30 32 35 37 40 43 46 49
as a % of sales 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Loans payable 0 7 8 8 9 10 10 11 12
as a % of sales 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Current portion of long-term debt 40 26 27 29 32 34 36 39 42
as a % of sales 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Total Current Liabilities 922 1.025 1.099 1.180 1.266 1.358 1.457 1.564 1.678
Net Working Capital 669 481 516 553 594 637 684 734 787
Working Capital Requirements -188 35 38 40 43 47 50 54
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Appendix 18: Dresser-Rand Capital Structure  
 















    Nopat Growth 3% (equals Long-Term growth rate) 
    Discount Rate ITS*: Cost of debt 6.5% 
    Tax-rate 33% 
    Net Debt increases at the historic CAGR (2012-2013) of 13.6% 
  
Expected Interest Rate: As Dresser-Rand has only a single bond outstanding, the expected interest rate 
equals the coupon rate of this bond. After the redemption of the bond, I assumed re-issuance with a 
similar coupon payment  
To determine the Continuing Value of interest tax shields beyond 2021, a growth perpetuity based on 
2021 interest tax shields, the cost of debt and the NOPAT growth rate is used. 
* The cost of debt appropriately incorporates the riskiness of the ITS payments as they are as uncertain as 
interest and principal payments 
Year
prior-year 











PV ITS ($ 
million)
2014e 1.050 6,50% 68 33% 23 21 
2015e 1.193 6,50% 78 33% 26 23 
2016e 1.355 6,50% 88 33% 29 24 
2017e 1.540 6,50% 100 33% 33 26 
2018e 1.749 6,50% 114 33% 38 28 
2019e 1.987 6,50% 129 33% 43 30 
2020e 2.257 6,50% 147 33% 49 32 
2021e 2.564 6,50% 167 33% 56 34 
Continuing Value 1.638 990 
1.207 
Nopat growth: 3,0%
Cost of debt 6,50%
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Appendix 20: Dresser-Rand Peer-Group 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg as of September 1, 2014 
Data in domestic currency (million) 
 









SUPERIOR ENERGY SERVICES INC 22,42 5292 USD 6746 4533 1221 569 26,92%
WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL PL 43,21 17384 USD 26311 16828 3935 2570 23,39%
CAMERON INTERNATIONAL CORP 24,84 14542 USD 17429 11477 1930 1508 16,81%
BAKER HUGHES INC 16,12 29405 USD 33013 26811 5842 3860 21,79%
FMC TECHNOLOGIES INC 19,39 12819 USD 13766 8685 1515 1227 17,45%
HALLIBURTON CO 25,64 57368 USD 62849 36482 9056 6742 24,82%
NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO INC 9,31 34518 USD 33867 22978 5075 4272 22,09%
RPC INC 8,58 4825 USD 4935 2917 888 30,45%
TENARIS SA 6,48 20317 EUR 19488 11546 3135 2511 27,15%
SCHLUMBERGER LTD 19,45 132522 USD 139234 54200 15949 11986 29,43%
DRIL-QUIP INC 0,00 3706 USD 3363 927 304 32,82%
ION GEOPHYSICAL CORP 22,71 514 USD 554 588 211 35,86%
OCEANEERING INTL INC 2,36 7193 USD 7170 4130 997 24,14%
OIL STATES INTERNATIONAL INC 10,70 3380 USD 3504 1977 474 357 23,99%












Sales EBITDA Best EBIT 
EBITDA 
Margin




Grant Prideco Inc 12/17/07 7032 11,62 12,88 3,93
SPN Fairway Acquisition Inc/TX 10/09/11 3357 6,07 9,34 1,59
Lufkin Industries Inc 04/07/13 3238 16,61 21,53 2,45
Maverick Tube Corp 06/11/06 2822 7,99 8,85 1,47
Hydril Co 02/12/07 1994 13,56 15,08 3,96
Lone Star Technologies Inc 03/28/07 1927 9,56 11,15 1,4
Wellstream Holdings Ltd 10/05/10 1367 14,33 17,33 2,23
Western Lakota Energy Services Inc 06/19/06 696 11,47 14,28 5,28
Enerflex Systems Income Fund 10/18/09 673 9,51 13,36 0,8
NATCO Group Inc 05/31/09 672 10,47 12,95 1,01
Median 1960 10,97 13,16 1,91
Average 2378 11,12 13,68 2,41
Min 672 6,07 8,85 0,80
Max 7032 16,61 21,53 5,28
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Appendix 22: Siemens Financial Statements (2011 – 2016) 
 
Balance Sheet Siemens (2011 – 2016):  
 
€ million, year-end Sep 30 2011 2012 2013 2014E 2015E 2016E
Cash and Cash equivalents 12.468 10.891 9.190 11.737 12.136 12.549
Marketable securities 477 524 601 417 431 446
Receivables 14.847 15.220 14.853 15.340 15.862 16.401
Inventory 15.143 15.679 15.560 15.572 16.101 16.649
Deferred income taxes 798 836 794 790 817 845
Other current assets 9.080 8.978 5.940 6.856 7.089 7.330
Long-term investments 4.966 4.436 3.022 3.214 3.464 3.718
Intangibles 20.150 21.664 22.940 23.485 25.143 26.542
Net fixed assets 10.477 10.763 9.815 9.737 9.755 9.856
Deferred income taxes 3.206 3.777 3.234 3.322 4.651 4.717
Other long-term assets 12.631 15.512 15.989 20.917 21.648 23.850
Total assets 104.243 108.280 101.938 111.387 117.097 122.902
Short-term debt 3.660 3.826 1.944 2.592 2.680 2.771
Accounts payable 7.677 8.036 7.599 8.002 8.274 8.556
Accrued liabilities 5.168 4.750 4.485 4.901 5.068 5.240
Deferred income taxes 2.032 2.204 2.151 2.092 2.163 2.236
Other current liabilities 25.023 23.820 21.689 24.044 24.861 25.706
Long-term debt 14.280 16.880 18.509 21.346 22.015 22.031
Pension plans 7.307 9.926 9.265 8.771 8.771 8.771
Deferred income taxes 595 494 504 501 501 501
Other accruals and provisions 6.345 7.043 7.165 6.974 6.974 6.974
Minority interest 626 569 516 516 542 585
Equity 31.530 30.733 28.111 31.648 35.248 39.530
Total liabilities and equity 104.243 108.281 101.938 111.387 117.097 122.902
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Income Statement Siemens (2011 – 2016): 
 
* Figures adjusted by the B/S/H/ Divestment  
 
€ million, year-end Sep 30 2011 2012 2013 2014E 2015E* 2016E*
Net Sales 73.515 78.296 75.874 78.454 75.402 77.913
Growth -3,2% 6,5% -3,1% 3,4% -3,9% 3,3%
Gross Profit 22.127 22.204 20.821 22.464 21.590 22.309
Gross Margin 30,1% 28,4% 27,4% 28,6% 28,6% 28,6%
R&D expense -3.925 -4.238 -4.291 -4.291 -4.124 -4.261
% of sales -5,3% -5,4% -5,7% -5,5% -5,5% -5,5%
SG&A expense -10.297 -11.162 -11.286 -11.281 -10.842 -11.203
% of sales 14,0% 14,3% 14,9% 14,4% 14,4% 14,4%
Other operating income/expense 53 516 76 80 55 65
Income from investments 147 -266 510 167 350 355
EBIT 8.105 6.778 5.838 7.139 7.029 7.265
EBIT Margin 11,0% 8,7% 7,7% 9,1% 9,3% 9,3%
Income from financial assets 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest income (expense) of Operations 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest (expense) income 491 506 159 188 62 116
Pre-tax income 9.242 7.279 5.843 7.327 7.091 7.381
Income taxes -2.231 -2.094 -1.630 -1.978 -1.915 -1.993
Effective tax rate 24,1% 28,8% 27,9% 27,0% 27,0% 27,0%
Minority interest -176 -132 -126 -145 -164 -188
Net Income 6.835 5.053 4.087 5.204 5.012 5.200
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 Cash Flow Statement Siemens (2011 – 2016):  
 
 
* Figures adjusted by the B/S/H/ Divestment  
€ million, year-end Sep 30 2011 2012 2013 2014E 2015E* 2016E*
Net Income 6.835 5.053 4.087 5.204 5.012 5.200
Minority interest 176 132 126 145 164 188
Depreciation and amortisation 2.650 2.836 2.261 3.075 2.975 3.074
Deferred taxes 2.231 2.094 1.630 0 0 0
Gain on disposals of assets, investments and businesses -1.229 -146 -618 -400 0 0
Losses/(gains) on sale of marketable securities 0 0 0 -378 0 0
(Income)/loss from equity investees, net of dividends 21 373 0 273 -251 -254
Other, including interest paid and received -2.041 -1.433 -1.097 0 420 420
Operating cash flow 8.643 8.909 6.389 7.919 8.320 8.628
Operating cash flow per share 10 10 8 9 10 11
(Inc)/dec inventories -1.135 -85 -218 17 -806 -849
(Inc)/dec accounts receivables -609 157 -293 33 -388 -390
Sale of trade receivables 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Inc)/dec other current assets -428 0 0 0 0 0
Inc/(dec) accounts payable 668 197 -217 -370 375 395
Inc/(dec) accrued liabilities 56 0 0 0 0 0
Inc/(dec) other current liabilities 748 -2.218 0 0 0 0
Pension funding 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in other assets and liabilities (provisions and customer)-350 -375 576 -500 -180 -185
Total change in other assets and liabilities -1.050 -2.324 -152 -820 -999 -1.029
Capex as a % of revenues 2,95% 2,82% 2,46% 5,87% 4,35% 4,28%
Capex incl. Intangibles -2.171 -2.206 -1.869 -4.244 -3.310 -3.420
Free cash flow from operations 5.422 4.379 4.368 2.855 4.011 4.179
Acquisitions -1.314 -2.801 -957 0 0 0
Increase in receivablesfrom financing activity -1.770 -2.269 -2.332 -1.683 0 0
Proceeds from disposals 2.285 846 2.463 547 0 0
Capital issuance/(sha repurchase) -764 -1.424 -1.409 -601 0 0
Dividends -2.356 -2.629 -2.528 -3.226 -3.108 -3.224
Dividends paid to minorities -158 -155 -152 -132 -139 -146
Foreign exchange effect on cash 5 68 -108 -55 0 0
Balancing item (inc. Currency, accounting changes) -899 -1.472 847 976 -29 -29
Cash inflow/outflow 564 -4 -1 -631 3 3
Net debt/(cash) beginning 5.559 4.995 9.291 10.662 11.293 8.578
Net debt/(cash) ending  4.995 9.291 10.662 11.293 8.578 5.284
Cash inflow/outflow 564 -4.296 -1.371 -631 2.715 3.294
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in $ million(except per share amounts) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
 Assets  
Current assets  
Cash and cash equivalents 160 201 198 223 179 207 333 421 295 127 147 128 123 135 151 123 157 162 174 190 
Restricted cash 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 28 30 24 27 24 18 25 12 12 8 
Accounts receivable 295 326 310 290 260 267 286 304 279 366 358 477 410 409 412 566 513 647 707 727 
Prepaid expenses and other 42 29 43 25 31 31 39 37 67 68 63 67 80 76 87 67 80 76 79 69 
Deferred income taxes, net 22 23 23 45 44 42 43 32 32 32 37 40 41 43 40 31 30 30 30 25 
Total current assets 883 975 947 936 836 842 998 1.084 982 1.007 1.059 1.151 1.126 1.162 1.221 1.356 1.423 1.491 1.714 1.736 
Property, plant and equipment, net 247 252 260 269 272 267 269 278 278 487 458 466 465 445 458 467 465 460 468 472 
Goodwill 419 442 465 486 483 458 490 487 505 874 840 851 914 880 894 911 887 891 918 928 
Intangible assets, net 435 436 437 431 432 430 431 426 423 559 527 499 523 512 511 507 495 487 485 479 
Deferred income taxes 22 26 25 28 27 26 26 29 42 40 38 11 11 18 12 15 14 21 18 12 
Other assets  68 65 64 68 70 77 77 79 84 97 111  
Total assets 2.005 2.132 2.132 2.150 2.050 2.022 2.214 2.305 2.229 3.035 2.988 3.042 3.108 3.088 3.173 3.333 3.362 3.434 3.700 3.738   
 Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity  
Current liabilities  
Accounts payable and accruals 385 402 393 412 340 339 357 401 371 504 521 595 573 511 544 600 623 661 673 729 
Customer advance payments 281 302 210 165 131 131 221 254 303 283 309 272 256 261 260 282 204 166 169 165 
Accrued income taxes payable 28 18 17 8 12 19 27 14 22 13 28 20 21 17 13 44 37 29 36 36 
Loans payable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 13 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Current portion of long-term debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 39 39 37 48 27 36 42 35 44 40 
Total current liabilities 694 722 620 585 483 489 605 669 774 849 909 927 887 838 844 963 905 891 921 970 
Deferred income taxes 21 23 21 39 38 33 44 26 23 49 48 45 44 51 49 36 37 49 47 55 
Postemployment and other employee benefit liabilities 109 111 112 110 106 104 108 109 90 86 83 136 128 125 124 143 136 134 127 74 
Long-term debt 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 535 925 1.015 988 1.030 1.059 1.069 1.015 1.106 1.131 1.296 1.247 
Other noncurrent liabilities 28 34 36 34 36 42 45 43 44 97 84 75 88 85 85 82 70 73 71 90  
Total liabilities 1.221 1.259 1.158 1.138 1.033 1.037 1.171 1.217 1.466 2.005 2.139 2.171 2.177 2.157 2.170 2.238 2.254 2.278 2.463 2.436   
Commitments and contingencies  
Stockholders' equity
Common stock 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Additional paid-in capital 386 389 394 397 399 373 344 342 - 242 96 105 112 121 131 141 143 151 157 162 
Retained earnings 462 522 597 638 660 695 733 785 778 796 836 905 929 963 1.004 1.085 1.118 1.171 1.220 1.253 
Accumulated other comprehensive loss -65 -40 -18 -23 -43 -84 -35 -40 -14 -6 -83 -139 -111 -156 -136 -135 -157 -172 -148 -119 
Total Dresser-Rand stockholders' equity 784 873 974 1.013 1.017 986 1.043 1.087 764 1.032 850 872 930 929 1.001 1.091 1.104 1.151 1.231 1.297 
Noncontrolling interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 -1 0 1 2 2 4 4 5 6 4 
  
Total stockholders' equity 784 873 974 1.013 1.017 986 1.043 1.087 762 1.030 849 872 931 931 1.003 1.095 1.108 1.156 1.237 1.301 
 
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity 2.005 2.132 2.132 2.150 2.050 2.022 2.214 2.305 2.229 3.035 2.988 3.042 3.108 3.088 3.173 3.333 3.362 3.434 3.700 3.738 
Balance Sheet Metrics
Cash per Share 1,91 2,47 2,42 2,72 2,18 2,52 4,05 5,12 3,59 1,71 2,17 1,92 1,93 2,12 2,29 1,83 2,37 2,27 2,43 2,58
Working Capital 189 253 327 351 353 354 394 415 207 159 150 224 239 324 377 393 518 600 793 766
Book Value 784 873 974 1.013 1.017 986 1.043 1.087 764 1.032 850 872 930 929 1.001 1.091 1.104 1.151 1.231 1.297
Book Value per Share 9,35 10,69 11,90 12,35 12,39 12,04 12,68 13,23 9,30 12,75 10,52 10,60 12,23 12,21 13,11 14,25 14,38 15,00 16,00 16,86
Tangible Book Value (69,4) (5,9) 72,4 95,7 102,2 98,3 121,9 174,2 (163,4) (401,4) (517,6) (478,6) (507,1) (463,2) (404,9) (327,0) (277,8) (226,8) (172,3) (109,2)
Tangible Book Value per Share -0,83 -0,07 0,88 1,17 1,24 1,20 1,48 2,12 -1,99 -4,96 -6,41 -5,82 -6,17 -5,72 -5,02 -4,27 -3,62 -2,96 -2,24 -1,42 
Debt to Capital 32,1% 29,8% 27,5% 26,8% 26,7% 27,3% 26,2% 25,4% 44,6% 48,6% 55,7% 54,1% 53,4% 54,3% 52,2% 49,0% 50,9% 50,2% 52,0% 49,7%
Net Debt to Capital 21,1% 16,2% 15,0% 12,7% 15,8% 14,2% 3,4% -4,9% 29,5% 44,8% 51,2% 49,9% 49,7% 50,4% 47,9% 45,4% 46,6% 46,2% 48,2% 45,5%
Return on Equity 20,8% 14,7% 18,4% 16,3% 12,9%
Return on Capital Employed 22,3% 16,0% 12,4% 14,2% 11,6%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 Appendix 23: Dresser-Rand Balance Sheet & Income Statement (2009 – 2013) 
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in $ million (except per share amounts)
  Net Sales of Products 1.841 1.484 1.640 1.925 2.220 
  Net Sales of Services 449 470 672 811 813 
Total Revenue 2.290 1.954 2.312 2.736 3.033 
  Cost of Products Sold 1.324 1.030 1.184 1.429 1.664 
  Cost of Services Sold 308 337 478 575 583 
Total Cost of Sales 1.632 1.367 1.662 2.004 2.247 
Gross Profit 658 587 649 732 785 
  Selling and Administrative Expenses 287 301 365 366 386 
  Research and Development Expenses 20 24 28 30 39 
  Fixed Asset Impairment of Cogen Facilities 40 
EBITDA 400 315 338 421 413 
Operating Profit 349 263 257 336 321 
Interest Expense, net -32 -33 -55 -60 -47 
Early Redemption Premium on Debt 0 0 -2 0 0 
Other (Expense) Income, net -5 -0 -3 0 -17 
Income Before Income Taxes 312 229 198 276 258 
Tax Rate 32,4% 30,1% 34,1% 33,7% 34,3%
Provision for Income Taxes 101 69 67 93 88 
Net (Income) Loss Attributable to Noncontrolling Interests 0 0 -0 -4 -1 
Net Income Attributable to Dresser-Rand 211 160 130 179 168 
Earnings per Share
  Basic 2,58 1,98 1,68 2,34 2,21
  Diluted 2,57 1,97 1,66 2,32 2,19
Weighted Average Shares
  Basic 81,7 81,0 77,5 76,5 76,1
  Diluted 81,9 81,5 78,3 77,0 76,8
As a % of Revenue
Total Cost of Sales 71,3% 70,0% 71,9% 73,2% 74,1%
Gross Profit 28,7% 30,0% 28,1% 26,8% 25,9%
  Selling and Administrative Expenses 12,5% 15,4% 15,8% 13,4% 12,7%
  Research and Development Expenses 0,9% 1,2% 1,2% 1,1% 1,3%
EBITDA 17,5% 16,1% 14,6% 15,4% 13,6%
Operating Profit 15,2% 13,4% 11,1% 12,3% 10,6%
Net Income Attributable to Dresser-Rand 9,2% 8,2% 5,6% 6,5% 5,6%
YOY Change
Total Revenue 4,3% -14,7% 18,3% 18,4% 10,8%
Gross Profit 6,3% -10,7% 10,6% 12,8% 7,3%
EBITDA 3,6% -21,4% 7,3% 24,8% -1,9%
Operating Profit 3,3% -24,7% -2,0% 30,6% -4,4%
Net Income Attributable to Dresser-Rand 6,6% -24,0% -18,8% 37,6% -5,9%
Diluted Earnings per Share 9,2% -23,6% -15,5% 39,9% -6,3%
2012 20132009 2010 2011
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